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
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# GUILTY

*A TRIBUTE TO THE  
BOTTOM MAN \* \**

AND A PLAIN REPLY TO

'NOT GUILTY, A DEFENCE OF THE BOTTOM DOG'

BY MR. R. BLATCHFORD

BY

FRANK BALLARD

D.D., M.A., B.Sc., F.R.M.S., Etc.

Author of

'The Miracles of Unbelief,' 'Clarion Fallacies,' 'Which Bible  
to Read,' 'Haeckel's Pantheism False,' 'Theomorphism True,' etc.



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***London***

**CHARLES H. KELLY**

**2 CASTLE STREET, CITY ROAD, AND 26 PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.**



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DEDICATED  
TO  
ALL MEN AND WOMEN  
WHO ARE  
OPEN TO REASON



## PREFACE

A VERY few words will suffice to explain the appearance of the following pages. In the book entitled *God and My Neighbour*, which has had a large sale in both paper and cloth editions, the writer gives some fifteen pages to the question 'Can man sin against God?' and styles this section of his work 'Determinism.' Feeling dissatisfied, apparently, with that exposition—as for many reasons he well might be—he issued later on a new series of articles in *The Clarion* dealing afresh, and at considerable length, with various phases of the subject. These were then embodied in a second book entitled *Not Guilty, a Defence of the Bottom Dog*. This, again, is now issued in a cheap paper edition, so that, in the author's words, 'cost may not stand in the way of those who wish to comprehend the new philosophy.' He also informs the general public that, in his opinion, this is 'the strongest, the clearest, the most human and the most useful book I have written.'

That such a work should in these days and in this country find readers and admirers to any extent worth regarding, is indeed significant, not only for Christian Churches, but for every English citizen and every man of sense or self-respect. Concerning Professor Haeckel's

popular work entitled *The Riddle of the Universe*,<sup>1</sup> Professor Paulsen, the well-known philosophical expert, said: 'I have read this book with burning shame—shame in regard to the general and philosophical culture of our people. That such a book should be possible, that it could be written, printed, bought, read, admired, accepted, by the nation possessing a Kant, a Goethe, a Schopenhauer, is painful indeed.' The same feeling must surely arise in the mind of any thoughtful man not already pledged to some anti-Christian programme, when he finds such a work as *Not Guilty* in vogue, printed and read, in the land of Milton and Shakespeare, Carlyle and Macaulay, Browning and Tennyson, Martineau and Gladstone. That the ethical principles for which all these, not to mention any others, stand, are to be swept away as less than the small dust of the balance by the confident self-assertions and superficial plausibilities of a popular journalist, is indeed startling to all who desire the well-being of their fellows, and especially to such as are watching, and are disposed to welcome, the development of modern democracy. If, as Mr. Cotter Morison asserts, and this book emphatically confirms, 'the sooner we get rid of moral responsibility the better,' then we are on the way back to social chaos rather than progressing towards a Golden Age.

The plain fact, however, that such things are printed and vigorously circulated, remains. It merits, indeed, decidedly more attention than it usually receives, either from lofty clericalism or self-complacent Nonconformity. If this writer's position be sound, there is not only an

<sup>1</sup> See *Haackel's Monism False*, pp. 5, 138.

end of all Christianity, but also of all morality. The reasons for such an assertion, here deliberately made, will be found in the pages that follow. Its gravity, at least, is self-evident.

There are two ways in which the baneful influence of such popular appeals may be met. One is by insisting upon the main principles of true morality, especially as embodied in Christian ethics. This is sufficiently done, in general, by innumerable writers who are certainly not all annihilated by the hand-wave of a modern editor.

The other method, more tedious and uninviting, yet sometimes manifestly necessary, is to show, definitely and in detail, the errors of this self-styled 'new philosophy' and their mischievous significance. No one knows better than I do the thankless nature of such a task. However manifestly needed, it is as a rule no more appreciated by ordinary Churches than welcomed by unbelieving outsiders. One's general reward is simply to be pronounced 'controversial' or 'pugnacious' and the like. Setting that aside, it remains only too true that none are so blind as those that will not see. The general state of the case is that those inside the Churches will not face the questions involved ; and those outside will not face the answers. Whether of the two is the wiser, or the more foolish, need not here be decided. Certainly, in regard to the latter, I find, whilst lecturing on these themes continually, little or no difficulty in answering questions, but ceaseless and almost insuperable difficulty in answering questioners.

Thus, on a recent occasion, the objector stated that he had read both the works here referred to and the

replies to them, but was just as much at sea as ever, 'with added sympathy for Mr. Blatchford.' He declined the opportunity to point out any mistakes or false statements in the preceding lecture—which embodied the following pages—but insisted that his 'general impression' was unfavourable to the Christian view of these matters. Such an attitude is only too typical, and must be left without characterization as being beyond human judgement. Neither in these pages nor elsewhere do I profess to give more than reasons for assertions. The ability or willingness to accept them, is a matter in which, as Paul said, 'every man will have to carry his own load.'<sup>1</sup>

Three points are here to be especially noted :

(1) With the personality of the writer of the book in question, I have nothing whatever to do. It matters not in the least who wrote it, whether the editor of *The Times*, or of *The Clarion*. For which reason it is quite unnecessary to keep on repeating the author's name. Such repetition becomes almost inevitably offensive. But it ought not to be necessary to point out that it is perfectly competent for any earnest thinker to criticize severely a published book, without being for that reason guilty of discourtesy to its writer. How sensitive, however, on his behalf are those who follow this writer's leadership, was illustrated recently when a hearer objected to 'the aspersions cast upon the character of the author of the book.' When pressed to give reasons for his feeling, he pleaded that in the course of the preceding lecture the phrase 'What-

<sup>1</sup> Gal. vi. 5 (Weymouth's translation).

ever be the motive of the writer' had been employed. In many such cases, alas! all efforts to be courteous appear as really unavailing as in other cases is the frank and full appeal to reason.

(2) Not only is nothing here said against the philanthropic aims which one may gladly regard as the ultimate object of such publications, but it is precisely because I for one—amongst numberless other Christians—so intensely share them, that the following reply is issued. It is just because every Christian who is true to his Master<sup>1</sup> is bound to be a philanthropist, in the widest as well as tenderest sense, that one is obliged to protest with the utmost possible earnestness against a doctrine which is not only intellectually false, but fraught with issues as socially ruinous as morally degrading. Many of us who, as Christians, have no objection whatever to be called Socialists—whenever the term is fairly and truly explained<sup>2</sup>—are driven for that very reason to oppose with might and main a mischievous delusion which, both in its moral implications and practical consequences, would, if adopted, utterly and for ever block the way to social amelioration.

(3) These pages being devoted strictly to the examination of one book, make no attempt to enter fully into the scientific or philosophical reasons against the so-called Determinism which is at present prominently

<sup>1</sup> 'He has anointed me to proclaim good news to the poor; to send away free those whom tyranny has crushed.'—Luke iv. 18 (Weymouth).

<sup>2</sup> See *Socialism and the Teaching of Christ*, by Dr. J. Clifford, Fabian Tracts, No. 78; also 'Socialism and Christianity,' by the present writer, in *The Citizen of To-morrow*, issued by the Methodist Publishing House for the Wesleyan Methodist Union for Social Service.



floating in the modern atmosphere. In a later and larger work I shall endeavour to show that both the name and the thing signified, are alike unworthy and untrue.

Meanwhile it is painfully necessary to point out that whatever value might have attached to such a publication as is here scrutinized, on the ground of its demand for more justice, its plea for tenderer sympathy, its insistence upon the underrated importance of heredity and environment, its general and genuine philanthropy, all is woefully vitiated by the superficial and degrading mock-philosophy in which it is so boastfully enwrapped. The author evidently has a kind heart, and does well to follow its promptings. But when, forgetting the fable of the frog and the ox, he poses as the setter forth of a sublime philosophical discovery, the well-intentioned is lost in the ridiculous. The kindest estimate of the whole case is to allow him for once the benefit of his own theory, and not hold him responsible for his acts—or their consequences.

F. B.

HEATON, NEWCASTLE,  
*January, 1907.*

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'We have acquired the knowledge of good and evil: we can choose the one and reject the other, and are thus burdened with a sense of responsibility for our acts. Doubtless we still obey the strongest motive, but there is something in ourselves which makes it to be a motive and regulates its strength—that is, makes it the strongest.'

SIR OLIVER LODGE, *Hibbert Journal*, Jan., 1905, p. 329.

'I hold that we are more certain of our power of choice and of responsibility than of any other fact, physical or psychical. Freedom of choice is unlike anything else in nature—it is a simple fact. Every time an intention is formed in the mind and a deliberate choice is made, we have an event unlike any previous event.'

PROF. J. H. POYNTING, F.R.S., *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1903, p. 243.

'The truth is that nothing that human beings do or are has any real value for us except on the understanding that it is possible for them to be or to do something different—so that what they do or are represents a vital act of personal and spontaneous will, instead of being merely the outcome of a long train of causes which lose themselves in the history of the general evolution of the universe. Apart from this vital element, feeling and action would lose nearly every quality for which men have hitherto valued them.

'Why should a child be devoted to even the fondest mother, if it knew that its mother could no more help loving it than the sun on a fine day could help shining in at the window? Could anything more uninteresting be imagined than the fidelity of an automaton friend? or anything less romantic than a passion for an automaton mistress? In short, we have only to eliminate freedom from our conception of human nature, and we shall find that we have eliminated the essence of all morality and all social civilization.'

W. H. MALLOCK, *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, p. 248.

## Introduction

**B**EYOND the fact that the author's own estimate of the book before us, as above noted, is shared by his admirers, who declare it to be 'the fruit of his ripest years and experience,' there is nothing new or original in his pages. The constant breaking up into little paragraphs, conjoined with lucid speech and homely illustration, are doubtless as effective as attractive features of style. They constitute a good example for all who desire to catch the ear of the people. But so far as thought is concerned, there is here nothing whatever which can be regarded as an addition to the section in *God and My Neighbour*. With regard to philosophical doctrines or moral principles, everything in this second book that merited reply, has already been fairly, frankly, and categorically met.<sup>1</sup>

Yet it must be allowed to every sincere author to elaborate any argument that he deems important, and endeavour to render it more impressive by added illustrations. These, therefore, are what concern us here. By way of introduction only two notes need be made, one in regard to the aim, the other as to the method, of the present reply.

(i) The aim of these pages is to take this author at his own word. Thus he openly asserts as follows (p. 203):

<sup>1</sup> See *Clarion Fallacies*, by the present writer (Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 47-105.

A tramp has murdered a child on the highway, has robbed her of a few coppers, and has thrown her body into a ditch.

Do you mean to say that tramp could not help doing that? Do you mean to say he is not to be blamed? Do you mean to say he is not to be punished?

Yes. I say all those things; and if all those things are not true, this book is not worth the paper it is printed on.

That such is the right estimate of the book, will, on these terms, be abundantly shown as we proceed. Of the three assertions just quoted, the two latter are manifestly only the natural accompaniments of the first. With it they stand or fall. The main assertion, upon the truth or falsehood of which everything in the whole of this 'new philosophy' turns, is that the tramp 'could not help doing' what he did. That the writer sees the importance of this statement, is exhibited in the preceding chapter, which closes with the conclusion, categorically set forth thus<sup>1</sup>:

That everything a man does is, at the instant when he does it, the only thing he *can* do: the only thing he can do *then*.

Now this is, plainly, only another way of putting the same case as is so often repeated, and with italics as though final, in the previous book<sup>2</sup>: '*If God is responsible for Man's existence, God is responsible for Man's acts.*' This, as has been shown,<sup>3</sup> admits of clear, straightforward, and conclusive answer, in a sentence. But really it ought not to call for answer at all. It is such a manifest begging of the whole question at issue, that it would seem impossible to maintain both the intelligence and the sincerity of the man who makes it. In a single word, if man is nothing more than an automaton, it is true. If man is anything more than an automaton, it is false. Thus, then, it amounts to nothing more than the bald assertion, at the very commencement

<sup>1</sup> p. 202. The italics are his.

<sup>2</sup> *God and My Neighbour*, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> *Clarion Fallacies*, p. 51.

of the discussion, that man is only an automaton. Which is precisely the thing to be proved.

That this author's admirers share the same unblushing confidence, the following extract from an admiring review of the book, in *The Clarion*, sufficiently shows :

The argument briefly stated is : That if God created all things, all must include both good *and* evil. A God creating *all* must be responsible for all.<sup>1</sup>

If God created the evil, why should God punish man, His creature, for the evil which God Himself created ?

This Blatchford declared to be impossible, and follows with this bold challenge :

Therefore, the Christian religion is untrue, and man is not responsible to God for his nature nor for his acts.

If we credit this reviewer with sincerity, it must clearly be at the expense of his intelligence. For he evidently does not see that this 'therefore'—a fair specimen of all the other 'therefores' in the whole book—is quadruply false. (i) At the outset man is assumed to be only a thing, which is the very thesis to be proved. (ii) 'Things' cannot by any possibility be 'evil' at all. (iii) God cannot, under any circumstances whatever, create evil. (iv) Christian philosophy has never asserted such a false and foolish notion as that God would punish man for anything which He Himself created. Yet this pitiful fourfold travesty of thought is styled an 'argument'!

The issue, then, is plainly before us. 'We are to ask whether it is true that everything a man does, is the only thing he *could* do at the instant of his doing it.' If the answer is 'yes,' then assuredly not only is this writer the true philosopher, but every vestige of the Christian faith is destroyed at a blow. To such a consequence he would raise no objection. But it is certainly not the only consequence. For equally, at one stroke, is all morality annihilated. To this he and his friends

<sup>1</sup> The italics are the reviewer's.

strongly demur. We shall fully face their demurrer in a moment. Enough now to point out plainly that the above quoted assertion—'God is responsible for Man's acts'—is a sheer contradiction in terms. If 'God is responsible,' it can only mean that there are no 'Man's acts' at all. Man would be, in such case, nothing but the tool of God's acts.

On the other hand, if this question is to be truly answered in the negative, then, by the writer's own avowal, both his book and the 'new philosophy' it sets forth, are not worth the paper they are printed on. Of the truthfulness of such an estimate, the reader shall judge for himself.

(ii) As to the method whereby this latter conclusion is here reached, one need only remind the reader that it is precisely that adopted by our author himself in *God and My Neighbour*, with reference to Christianity and the Bible. It cannot therefore be considered any more incoherent or one-sided than that work.

The general situation is as simple as significant. A book is published, it matters not by whom, setting at defiance all accepted moral principles ; trampling boastfully under foot convictions long cherished as sacred by vast numbers of men, including many of the greatest and noblest, through generations past ; challenging all and sundry to disprove it, and staking its whole worth on a single issue. It is open to any one, in the interests of truth, not only to accept such a challenge, but to deal with it in whatever way may be most effective, so long as personalities are excluded and accurate statements of fact are accompanied by valid processes of reasoning.

## II

## Unworthy Boasting and Uncalled - for Contumely

THERE is an old and generally accepted maxim that 'good wine needs no bush.' It applies as fully to mental as to physical matters. If a 'new philosophy' be so wondrously true and applicable as to explain all the apparent evil of the past, and provide an infallible cure for all possible ills of the future, it certainly does not require the weak and foolish vaunting which everywhere accompanies the doctrines of *God and My Neighbour* and *Not Guilty*. Imagine a genuine philosopher writing thus :

Hundreds of able and educated ministers of religion have tried to answer my arguments. Not one of them has succeeded.

Curiously enough, the very next paragraph asserts that 'there has not yet appeared a man who could even face the argument.' But how 'hundreds' of men could try to answer anything, and yet not one of them 'even face' it, is a problem which must be left for *Clarion* readers to solve. Doubtless not a few of them would approve of the writer's own solution.

Out of the many Christian scholars who have preached or written upon my assertion, not one has touched the argument at all. Every man of them has evaded it.



Now is it too much, considering the gravity of the issues at stake, to ask the reader to judge honestly for himself as to the truth or falsity of this assertion? Four replies at least, from Christian sources, are easily accessible.<sup>1</sup> With these open to the scrutiny of every man, one cannot but deliberately affirm that the assertion just quoted is as false as false can be. Not one of these Christian replies has 'evaded' anything that merited notice.

So when we come to the second book, the same false statement and childish boasting, which continually appear, would be in themselves sufficient to cause every thinker to come to the 'new philosophy' with the gravest suspicion.

A few specimens out of many will suffice. This is how the case is stated in *The Clarion*:

My defence of the 'Bottom Dog' is now getting into circulation, and its progress is marked by the clouds of verbiage which reviewers and lecturers raise wherever it goes.

Now, there is nothing in the prattle and prate of these tedious persons which can in the least deceive or decoy me away from the truth. I do not propose to answer all the foolish men who are talking and writing about me and my work. Not one of them has said anything to the purpose.

With all due appreciation of this specimen of literary modesty, let us now turn to the book itself. On p. 12,

<sup>1</sup> Three of these were issued immediately after the publication of *God and My Neighbour*. I mention *Clarion Fallacies* first, both because it first appeared and because in it some sixty pages of careful print are given in direct and categorical reply to every serious statement in the fifteen pages of the aforesaid book's section upon 'Determinism.' In addition to this, however, Dr. Warschauer, a graduate of the same university as Professor Haeckel, published *Anti-Nunquam*, a most able booklet, in which the reader is invited to find one single evasion. Mr. G. Haw also gathered together the replies which appeared in *The Clarion* under the title, *The Religious Doubts of Democracy*. And later on, Mr. W. T. Lee issued another book entitled *My Neighbour and God*, fully and fairly meeting every main position in Mr. Blatchford's work.

## UNWORTHY BOASTING, UNCALLED-FOR CONTUMELY 19

after begging the whole question at issue, as usual, by the assertion—

He who creates nothing is responsible for nothing.  
Man created nothing : man is responsible for nothing.

the author proceeds to say :

That argument has never been answered. But attempts have been made to evade it ;

wherein not only is a bald assumption styled an 'argument,' but objectors are charged with intentional evasion.

A still more flagrant case of the same thing occurs on the next page (13). Here we are told that—

God is the 'First Great Cause.' He created all things, the evil and the good. How can God blame man for the effects of which God is the cause ?

For the defeat of all Christian apologists, it is not necessary for me to add another word : the argument is invincible as it stands.

Assuming sincerity, what becomes of the intelligence of an author who asserts the creation of evil *things*?—or who does not see that in the ensuing question he is calmly assuming the very thing that has to be proved ? And then the following braggadocio is triumphantly proclaimed an 'invincible argument.' Such a literary method would be positively comic if it were not for the tragic consequences involved.

But it reappears in connexion with every phase of the whole theme. Thus, in regard to the vexed question of free will, we read (p. 169) :

The free will delusion has been a stumbling-block in the way of human thought for thousands of years. Let us try whether common sense and common knowledge cannot remove it.

Free will is a subject of great importance to us in this case : and it is one we must come to with our eyes wide open and our wits wide awake ; not because it is very difficult, but because it has been

tied and twisted into a tangle of Gordian knots by twenty centuries full of wordy but unsuccessful philosophers.

The cause of all the confusion on this subject may be shown in a few words.

Then follow seventeen pages of attempted exposition ; at the close of which we read (p. 188) :

That I hope disentangles the many knots into which thousands of learned men have tied the simple subject of free will, and disposes of the claim that man is responsible because his will is free.

It strikes one as somewhat remarkable, at the outset, that 'thousands of learned men' should thus have been blindly waiting for a Daniel to come to judgement in the person of the Editor of *The Clarion*. But other subjects serve to illustrate the same indebtedness. Thus in regard to the whole subject of evolution, Professor Huxley, who might be supposed to know, was wont to say that what is really needed is a true theory of variation. This, however, gives our present author no trouble at all.

Hundreds of books and papers have been written about 'variation,' and to read some of them one might suppose variation to be a very difficult subject. But it is quite simple, and will not give us any trouble at all.

The main theme of all is similarly dismissed with a wave of the editorial hand, such as the Pope himself might well envy (p. 38) :

I say that there is no such thing as a known law of God. There is no such thing as sin.

*Cadit quæstio.* What further need have we of discussion?

The author modestly avows that he does not know whether his book 'is eloquent or not, clever or not'; but he adds, 'I feel quite sure that it is *true*.' Which is, however, precisely what others deny.

Is it, then, inevitably part of the 'new philosophy' to

add scorn to its boasting? It would appear so, from the numberless instances in which contumely is poured upon the devoted heads of all who dare to doubt the author's infallibility. It is but a light matter to assert that—

The fact is, the British people, after more than a thousand years of Christian teaching, do not know what true morality is. And how should they know, when their teachers in the Church do not know? The Churches have never understood morality nor human nature.

But the mention of specific names gives point and weight to contempt. Thus in regard to the pastor of the City Temple, who may surely be regarded as intelligent, whether we accept his theology or not, we are told that his attempted reply (p. 127)—

Is an example of the confusion of mind into which educated men fall when they deal with this simple subject.

Mr. Chesterton, too, may pass, one would think, as a man of mind, whatever paradoxes adorn his style. Yet we are told (p. 131)—

He is always falling into blunders about heredity and environment because he has never learnt what heredity and environment are.

Hence, putting both together, our modest author proceeds (p. 133):

I am grateful to Mr. Campbell and to Mr. Chesterton for their arguments. They serve the useful purpose of exemplifying the confusion of thought upon this subject, which exists in quarters where we should least expect to find it.

The meekness of this rebuke, however, scarcely reappears in the case of another clerical delinquent (p. 233):

The most surprising example of this mental squinting is afforded by the Rev. C. A. Hall, who may be said to squint with both eyes;

whilst the Rev. Charles Marson is (p. 235)—

A very clever and witty man, who is hopelessly muddled over this simple matter.

After this it is the simplest proceeding to put a fool's cap upon the whole fraternity.

I often wonder where the clergy learn their logic.

O sweet simplicity! Yet a crumb of comfort is thrown to such poor clerical babes in their kindergarten, even in the company afforded by the following cultured estimate (p. 237):

This idea is expressed with characteristic clumsiness and obscurity by Bishop Butler, in that monument of loose thinking and foggy writing, *The Analogy of Religion*.

That the monopoly of clear thinking belongs to this writer is constantly assumed, as might be expected (pp. 191, 194, 195, &c.):

The subject of self-control is another simple matter which has been made difficult by slovenly thinkers.

But, it is said, even a bad man sometimes tries to be good. That is slovenly thinking.

'Then,' exclaims the confused opponent, 'the man himself counts for nothing?'

After which it cannot surprise any reader to find the whole case summed up thus (p. 252):

I claim to have proved that the prosecution do not understand the case, and that their arguments are for the most part mere misrepresentations or misunderstandings of the issues and the facts.

All this talk is, in its easy dogmatism, very delightful to a certain class of readers. But it is as empty, if as pretty, as a soap-bubble. It is doubtless an effective style for the man in the street. But as soon as the student touches it, the bubble vanishes, leaving not a wrack of reason or philosophy behind. With the writer's ultimate intentions we have here nothing to do. But as an introduction to or defence of the 'new philosophy' such a blast of brazen trumpets speaks for itself.

Lest, however, the reader should think that we are

doing this writer any injustice, or are underrating his philosophic humility, one more specimen may be submitted for general appreciation (*Clarion*, March 9, 1906).

The case for the Bottom Dog is as simple as it is complete. It is not a mere theory or opinion; it is a demonstrated truth. It is not a matter for argument. There is nothing to argue about. There is no possible refutation. To argue against my case is as absurd as to argue against the statement that three times four are twelve.

It is so with the case for the Bottom Dog. I have not made an assertion merely: I have proved it. You may not like the result. But you cannot disprove my proof. You cannot answer me. It is a mere waste of words to argue.

Therefore the Christian religion is smashed as completely as Humpty Dumpty.

I am not arguing with you, ladies and gentlemen. I am telling you.

And this is the sort of stuff that is captivating thousands of men and women in the land to-day! Do not Professor Paulsen's words recur with smarting force? The least that can be said is that any writer who, on such a vast theme, thus lets himself loose, compels the question as to whether, after all, he is *compos mentis*. Whilst the fact that readers are found to take it seriously, is even less mischievous than it is pitiful.

## III

## Manifest Self-contradictions

WE come now, however, to something more serious. As soon as the careful reader, undeterred by epithets or scorn, comes to scrutinize what is here set down, his amazement grows from more to more as he finds the author flatly and cheerfully contradicting himself, without apparently the least consciousness of or concern for such a philosophical *hara-kiri*. An exhaustive list of instances would take far too much of our space. A few only can be specified. These, however, will amply suffice to show the worth of any philosophy which either needs or permits such violations of rational principle. It will be most convenient to exhibit them side by side. In no case, be it observed, does the context avail to mitigate the manifest contradiction. So manifest indeed are they, that not one of them was or need be sought after. They simply throw themselves upon any serious contemplator of these pages.

The very title of the work before us is, at the outset, in direct conflict with what has been already vehemently asserted.

*God and My Neighbour.*

(p. ix) I mentally apostrophize the Christian British people. You are a mercenary, self-indulgent, frivolous, boastful, *blood-guilty* mob of heathen.

*Not Guilty.*

(p. 10) No man is answerable for his own acts.

Furthermore, on p. 75 of *God and My Neighbour* the paragraph which commences with a misquotation from Tennyson, ends with the question 'Is it not so?' The plain aim of the writer is to disprove the Christian doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, by representing as a wholesale tragedy that which takes place throughout all nature in evolution through natural selection. In this his second volume, however, he himself supplies the answer to his own former question.

'Nature is red in beak and claw.'  
On land and in sea the  
animal creation chase and  
maim and slay and devour  
each other, &c., &c.

(*Not Guilty*, p. 41) The notions of the 'struggle for existence' and the 'survival of the fittest' have been too commonly taken to mean that life in the animal world is one tragic series of ruthless single combats: that every man's hand always was and ever must be against the hand of every man, and every beast's tooth and claw against the tooth and claw of every beast.

But if we read Darwin's *Descent of Man*, and Prince Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid amongst Animals*, we shall find that the law of natural selection does not favour any such horrible conclusion.

Which is true—and is at the same time a conclusive answer to the writer's own former indictment of the Christian doctrine.

Coming now to the statements made with such gusto in the second book, the following will be alike significant and sufficient. The italics, in all but the last three cases, are the author's.



- (p. 10) I claim that men should not be classified as good and bad.  
 There are no good and no bad (*Clarion*, in answer to Rev. C. Noel).
- (p. 194) When a man knows what is good and wishes to be good, he will try to be good.
- (260) Good women : think—  
 Good men : think—  
 My friends, for the sake of good men who are better than their gods ; for the sake of good women who are the pride and glory of the world—I ask you for a verdict.
- (88) A child is not born with capacities, but only with potentialities.
- (97) We must bear in mind that children are not born with intellect and conscience, but only with capacities for their development.
- (96) It is only a figure of speech to speak of the mind and the body as distinct from each other. The mind and the body are one.
- (105) The cat is happy with food and a place before the fire ; but the human being needs food for the soul as well as for the body.
- (195) The man counts for just as much as his heredity and environment amount to, for his heredity and environment are *he*.
- (23) Heredity makes and environment modifies a man's nature. And both these forces are *outside* the man.
- (135) The swimmer is something more than a mere heredity. He is a man—in his battle with the stream of environment *he is using* heredity and environment. For environment taught him to swim.
- (126) Thomas was a drunkard from heredity and was saved *by environment*.
- (125) Thomas had the same hereditary inclination to drink. But a wise friend warned him and *with a hard struggle* he escaped from the danger.

- (10) I shall be told that this means that no man is answerable for his own acts. That is exactly what it does mean.
- (207) I shall ask for compensation from the society whose unjust laws and immoral neglect are responsible for the fact that a brother man has been allowed to grow up an ignorant savage.
- (193) If our heredity be good and if our environment be good we *must* act well ; we cannot help it.  
If our heredity be bad and if our environment be bad, we *must* act ill : we cannot help it.
- (260) It is no use asking God to help us ; we must help ourselves.
- (234) I accuse both society and the criminal of injurious action. I blame neither.
- (Clarion) Can any one who knows what men and women and children should be, look upon the wrecks and shames of our *contemptible* and *mean* civilization without *remorse* and *shame* ?
- (235) I say neither can help it. But I say that both can be taught to help it, and that both should be taught to help it. Is there anything illogical in that ?
- [Only this—that if they are taught to help it, they are taught to contradict the whole doctrine of this book. So the 'new philosophy' itself teaches men that it is false.]
- (165) Conscience is nothing more nor less than the action of the memory.
- (164) Memory reminds him that he is engaged, *and* that it would be 'wrong' to follow his desire.
- (174) How was it that his will to fish changed to his will not to fish ? It was the result of environment. He had learnt that fishing was cruel. This *knowledge controlled* his will.
- (188) It is true that men often do wrong when they *know better*.

- (199) This *desire* comes of environment, and it *rules* the will and *compels* the will to will a further effort.
- (201) A man wants to learn. He begins to learn. He finds the work difficult and irksome. *He has to spur himself on by all kinds of expedients.*
- (10) No man is answerable for his own acts.
- (210) Perpetrators of the most *inhuman* and terrible crimes.

But in addition to complete sentences such as the above, it is no less important to mark the perpetual recurrence of phrases and brief expressions which manifestly involve a downright contradiction in terms. Of this, however, the author appears to be either blissfully ignorant or recklessly regardless. A few will suffice out of multiplied instances, with brief comment upon each.

- (p. 10) I claim that since we do not hold a man worthy of praise for being *born beautiful*, nor of blame for being *born ugly*, neither should we hold him worthy of praise for being *born virtuous*, nor of blame for being *born vicious*.
- (i) 'Beautiful' and 'ugly' are here physical qualities. 'Virtuous' and 'vicious' are moral qualities. It is utterly illogical to argue from the one to the other, as if they were precisely the same.
- (ii) No man ever was or will be 'born' either 'virtuous' or 'vicious.'
- (19) Many of our wrongdoers are ignorant or diseased or insane or mentally deformed.
- Entirely untrue. There never was, or could be, such a thing as an ignorant doer of *wrong*. That an insane person should do *wrong* is unthinkable.
- (25) We must not fall into the bad habit of thinking of heredity and environment apart from each other, for it is *both* and not either of them that make man's character,
- Quite untrue. Neither the one nor the other, nor both together, make moral character. If character be not moral, it is not character. If it be moral, it cannot be made.

- (170) When the free-will party say that man has a free will, they mean that he is free to act as he chooses to act. There is no need to deny that. *But what causes him to choose?* That is the pivot upon which the whole discussion turns.
- It is rather the rock upon which this whole 'new philosophy' is hopelessly wrecked. For:
- (i) 'Causes' is here, as elsewhere, only an ambiguous term for 'compels.' The real statement is always as p. 175: 'He is only free to decide as the stronger of two motives compels him to decide.'
  - (ii) 'Compels him to choose' is a contradiction in terms. If he is compelled, in any direction, he does not choose. If he chooses, he is not compelled.
- (171) His heredity and his environment have fixed his choice before he makes it.
- In that case he never makes it. A 'fixed choice' is as absurd as a round square.
- (176) Lady Macbeth chose as her overpowering ambition compelled her to choose.
- This is typical of many such statements (175, 177, 184, &c., &c.). In all such cases we have a contradiction in terms. A compelled choice is unthinkable. The true question in Lady Macbeth's case is, how did her ambition come to be 'overpowering'?
- (187) They know that children may be made good or bad by good or evil training, and that the will follows the training.
- (i) We have already been told that there are no good or bad, but only fortunate and unfortunate (p. 10).
  - (ii) No children can by any possibility be *made* good or bad morally—again a contradiction in terms.
  - (iii) The will does not always follow the training. The writer was trained to be a Christian.

(194) When a man knows what is good and wishes to be good, he will try to be good. He cannot help trying.

And he tries to be better because heredity or environment *causes* him to wish to be better.

(So too 191): Heredity and environment compel him to try.

(i) When a man wishes to be good he is exercising the conscious freedom of his personality.

(ii) 'Cannot help trying' is a contradiction in terms. A man may be compelled to act, but not to try. If he tries he is not compelled, for trying involves spontaneous action.

(iii) 'Causes' is here only an ambiguity for compels. But no man can by any possibility be compelled to wish. If he wishes, something more than external influence is involved.

(194) Heredity and environment will *make* him good or bad, as they are good or bad.

(i) 'There are no good or bad.'

(ii) Certainly heredity and environment cannot themselves by any possibility be morally good or bad. They can only, at the utmost, be influential for good or ill.

(iii) Nothing in heaven or earth can by any possibility '*make*' any man good or bad. Made goodness is a contradiction in terms.

(197) I believe that I am what heredity and environment made me. But I know that I can make myself better or worse if I try.

What is there in that paragraph that is inconsistent with my belief?

Only this—that it gives away the whole case.

(i) 'Better or worse,' when there are no good or bad!

(ii) Whatever making is done, is *not* done by heredity or environment. 'I make myself.'

(197 *cont.*) What causes me to try? If I try to live better, it is evident that I wish to live better. What makes

Certainly not. Nothing can *make* a man wish. A made wish is no wish at all; it is simply a yielding to pres-

me wish? Heredity and environment.

sure. A wish is a man's free identification of himself with a suggestion. All that environment can do is to provide the suggestion. All that heredity can do is to provide the potentiality for self-determination.

- (199) Although we say that man is the creature of heredity and environment, we do not say that he has no self-control. We only say that his self-control comes from heredity and environment, and is limited and *controlled* by heredity and environment.
- (200) We all know that we can train and curb ourselves. No one has any doubt about that. The question is—what causes us to do the one or the other? The answer is—heredity and environment.
- (211) Before you are angry with me for defending the prisoner, be sure that you are not confounding the ideas of the criminal and the crime. I hate the crime as much as any man here; but I do not hate the criminal.
- (i) Controlled *self-control* is a contradiction in terms.
- (ii) If a man is controlled by heredity and environment, there is neither need nor room for *self-control*.
- (iii) If a man is self-controlled he may be 'limited' but never 'controlled' by heredity and environment.
- (i) Here, as ever, 'causes' means 'compels.'
- (ii) If heredity and environment compel us to act in a certain way of action, then *we* do not train *ourselves* at all—they mould us as clay is moulded. In which case, self, personality, manhood, is annihilated.
- (i) The assumption that Christian philosophy means that we 'hate the criminal,' is utterly false.
- (ii) If 'no man is answerable for his own acts' (p. 10), there can be no 'crime' to hate. To say that a knife committed a crime is absurd. If the murderer is not answerable for his acts, he is as truly a thing as the knife, and equally incapable of crime.

- (215) There is not one in a thousand of us who *might* not have become a shame and horror to our fellows had our environment been as cruel and hard as the environment of these from whom we shrink appalled.
- (i) Christian philosophy does not 'shrink appalled' from any cases of human depravity, as witness the facts of Christian Missions everywhere.
- (ii) 'Might' in these cases is perfectly true, but gives up the writer's whole case. The only expression here, consistent with the doctrine of this book, is 'would certainly.' And that is quite contrary to facts.
- (260) There is hardly a battered drab, a hardened thief, a hooligan, who *might* not have been an honest and useful citizen under fair conditions.
- Out of a hard and cruel environment some of the noblest of human characters have sprung. Some of the worst of criminals, both ancient and modern, have been reared 'under fair conditions.' To ascribe such results to heredity, is simply to beg the whole question at issue.

So we might go on, only too easily. These instances, however, more than suffice to justify the title of this chapter.

## IV

## False Statements as to Christian Facts

**T**HESE also so abound that we must be content to exhibit them only by type. The following are true and fair samples of the rest (p. 45):

The Church has often pleaded for 'charity' to the poor, but has never come to the rescue of the Bottom Dog because the Churches have never understood morality nor human nature.

Passing over the studied insolence—it is no less—of the last remark, this statement calls for threefold comment:

(1) The Churches have never recognized such a creature as the 'Bottom Dog,' in all their relations to humanity. Never under any circumstances, in the Bible or out of it, is such a contemptuous term as 'dog' applied by Christian philosophy to human nature. The reply which will of course be immediately made by this writer's admirers, that it is here only a figure of speech, is, unfortunately, flatly contradicted by his own words (p. 19):

There are some wrong-doers who are base or savage by nature. These should be regarded as we regard base or savage animals: as creatures of a lower order, dangerous but not deserving blame nor hatred. And this is the sound view.

Compared with this estimate, the Christian doctrine



that all men are sinners, is indeed a tribute to the Bottom Man, for it recognizes, in spite of all his failures and follies, his degradation or depravity, that he is a creature of a higher order, deserving blame because capable of response to love's appeal, yet always a moral being, and never to be classed with 'savage animals.' All the real contempt for human nature comes, as we shall presently see still more clearly, not from the Churches but from those who vituperate them.

(2) If by the sneer at 'charity,' and the mention of 'rescue,' is meant that the Churches have not inaugurated some drastic social or political programme, the answer is that it has never been their duty so to do—nor have they ever had the power to attempt it. Their business has been to make plain great principles of truth and right and love, and secure their application to society by means of ennobled individuals.

Whatever may be said upon the hackneyed theme of Christian failures, it has always been true, as it still is true, that the prevention of social amelioration has come about from human nature, whether within or without the Churches, not from the principles involved in Christian morality. This the writer of *God and My Neighbour* himself acknowledges when, on p. ix, he says:

Ladies and gentlemen, I say, you are Christian in name, but I discern little of Christ in your ideals, your institutions, or your daily lives. . . . It is very evident that our common English ideals are anti-Christian, and that our commercial, foreign, and social affairs are run on anti-Christian lines.

Which is all too true. But can a greater piece of inconsistency be conceived than thus—and on every possible occasion—to denounce what we have, as bad, ('you are a mercenary, self-indulgent, frivolous, boastful, blood-guilty mob') because anti-Christian; and then, in the very same book, as elsewhere, plead and storm and labour hard that it may be continued? For the whole

purpose of the book is, manifestly, to enlarge and intensify the anti-Christian element everywhere.

(3) Meanwhile, whatever the faults of the Churches, they are doing, if not all they can do, more than any other human institution has ever attempted, for the actual rescue of the Bottom Man. So far as actual contact with the 'battered drab, the broken pauper, the hardened thief, the hopeless drunkard, the lurking tramp,' together with the despairing, woe-begone, hungry and helpless 'submerged tenth,' is concerned, any one of our well-known Christian Missions in the great cities is doing more in one week than all unbelief, as such, has done in all past history.

Again on p. 8 of the book before us, we read :

Much golden eloquence has been squandered in praise of the successful and the good : much stern condemnation has been vented upon the wicked. I venture now to plead for those of our poor brothers and sisters who are accursed of Christ and rejected of men.

Here the first sentence may mean something or nothing. Certainly Christian philosophy has never lauded success merely as such, or praised the good beyond the rightful recognition of moral endeavour. The second sentence points to that which is justified just in proportion to the reality of the wickedness contemplated. The third sentence is worse than false. There is no instance in all the Christian Scriptures of any of 'our poor brothers and sisters' being 'accursed of Christ.' To print this as a true representation of Matt. xxv. 41 is but unworthy and misleading bathos. For those who are there condemned are precisely those who continually—in all reality—are pronounced accursed by this writer himself and the whole *Clarion* staff. To reiterate, 'I blame no man' by the side of the weekly *Clarion* leaderettes, is but a verbal glamour too transparent to deceive a child. The real treatment of 'our poor brothers and sisters' by the Christ of the Gospels,

is very much more truly typified in John viii. 1-II, as the whole world of humanity knows.

Yet again, what are we to make of this?—p. 8 :

Hitherto all the love, all the honours, all the applause of this world and *all the rewards of heaven*, have been lavished on the *fortunate* and the *strong* : and the portion of the unfriended Bottom Dog, in his *adversity and weakness*, has been curses, blows, chains, the gallows, and everlasting *damnation*.

Mark well the words here italicized. Apart from the unwarranted use of the last word—producing a false modern impression by means of an archaism<sup>1</sup>—every statement here is reprehensibly false. Neither the Bible nor Christian philosophy gives the slightest warrant for such a misrepresentation. There has never been a single case of 'reward' for being 'fortunate,' or 'curse' for being 'weak.'

To give all instances of such false representations would occupy all our pages. One or two more only shall be specified, as types. p. 215 :

To loathe and punish the victims of society and never lift a hand against the wrongs that are their ruin, is that reasonable ?

Has any one ever said that it was? Or is the implication true that Christianity has never lifted a hand against social wrongs? It is false. Christian social reformers have done in the past, and are doing to-day, quite as much as non-Christian, for the betterment of social conditions. p. 242 :

The Christian method of dealing with the burglar is to neglect him in his childhood and his youth, to allow him to become a burglar, from sheer lack of opportunity to become anything else, and then to lecture him and send him to prison.

<sup>1</sup> If the writer is as intelligent as he claims to be, he must know that in the Revised Version, with good reason, this word never occurs. Would he be content to refer to Socialism in out-of-date terms which would perpetuate prejudice against it? The fact that the Old Version is still used in many pulpits, is quite irrelevant, and only shows the obtuseness of religious conservatism.

Such an allegation is doubly false—in what it asserts, and in what it implies. Unbelief is manifestly unreasonable—one moment it complains that the Churches are too anxious about their schools and religious teaching, the next they are accused of neglecting childhood. The latter, certainly, is an unmeasured libel, as the whole history of Christianity emphasizes. Nor is it any less false to assert—however lamentable many features of our present civilization may be—that ‘the burglar’ in general becomes such from sheer lack of ‘opportunity’ to do differently. Assuredly no fair-minded man would ever attribute to Christian Churches the responsibility for all who do, through many and devious paths, become criminals (p. 244):

We know that through all our pury civilization, in all the fine cities of our wealth, our culture, and our boastful piety, the ruin of children, the production of monsters, the desecration of human souls, is going steadily and ruthlessly on. We know this and the Christian knows this; but we propose to prevent it, to stop it by striking at the root cause: the Christian hopes to check it by lopping off here and there one of the fruits.

What is the cause of crime? The Christian does not know. What is the cause of ignorance? The Christian does not know. What is the cause of poverty? The Christian does not know.

The impudence of these last sentences is probably effective with a certain type of mind. But, when viewed in the light of certain facts and true philosophy, there is nothing in them save glamorous misrepresentation. One or two points, carefully noted, will suffice to demonstrate this.

(1) ‘The desecration of human souls’ is, for Determinism, a mere empty catch-phrase. If ‘no man is answerable for his own acts,’ there is no soul to desecrate. The human animal, in such case, is nothing more than a puppet pulled by the wires of heredity and environment. Mind is nothing more than body,<sup>1</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> See quotation (from *Not Guilty*, p. 96), on p. 26.

if that be so, all that can be ruined in children is their bodies.

(2) As to the wrong which, from the non-Determinist standpoint, 'is going steadily and ruthlessly on,' the above assertion concerning the Christian is as untrue as any statement contrary to fact can be. For the whole Christian philosophy, as every honest student of the New Testament knows, is concerned first and above all else with the root whence springs all the wrong that brings earth's misery in its train. There is more truth in one word of Christ's hereupon,<sup>1</sup> than in all that *The Clarion* has ever printed. For it is 'out of the heart'—which is something more than heredity plus environment—that 'evil thoughts, murders, adulteries,' &c., proceed. The avowal that the 'root cause' of all the wrongs of civilization is in environment, is falsified by facts on every hand. That it is only and altogether in heredity plus environment (p. 233, &c.), is a mere assertion which begs the whole question and which is contradicted by conscience in each man, by the moral consciousness of mankind, by all human speech and literature, and by that ultimate self-consciousness which is, according to Professor Huxley, 'our one mental certainty.'

(3) This writer manifestly contradicts himself, seeing that here, as often, it is implied that Christian ideals and practices are responsible for the injustices and miseries of civilization—whereas he elsewhere says, as we have already seen, that our ideals and practices are anti-Christian.<sup>2</sup>

(4) Whether it is likely that the wrong will be prevented by telling every man that he cannot possibly do wrong; whether crime will be lessened by teaching that no man is responsible for anything he does; whether 'the production of monsters and the ruin of children' will be stopped by proclaiming that every man who does an

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xv. 19.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 34 above.

evil deed cannot possibly help it,—may be left to the judgement of all who are rightly outside an asylum.

Yet once more (p. 252):

I claim to have proved that the theory here advocated is based upon justice and reason, and is more moral and more beneficent than the Christian religion, under which so much wrong and waste and misery continue to exist *unchecked* and *unrebuked*.

Here it need only be pointed out again that: (1) If 'no man is answerable for his own acts,' wrong and injustice are impossible, for both of these imply personal responsibility on the part of the doer. We shall also see in a moment that morality itself becomes unthinkable. (2) But the accompanying statement is doubly false, viz. in its suggestion and in its affirmation. The suggestion is that Christian philosophy does not check or rebuke 'wrong' in general. This is too manifestly false to call for disproof, though such may easily be found in the writer's own words—as where he asserts that Christianity<sup>1</sup> 'results in established ignorance and injustice with no visible remedies beyond personal *denunciation*, the prison, and a few coals and blankets.' The affirmation that Christianity is responsible for the degree in which 'wrong and waste and misery' which ought to be checked and rebuked, are not so opposed, is mere reckless slander. Assuredly the checking and rebuking of such wrongs as drink and gambling and lust, which are the cause of most of the waste and misery of civilization, have not come from unbelief, but have come from Christian Churches more than from any other source whatever.

In regard to the drink curse, especially, no direct notice whatever is taken in these pages. Yet it was concerning this that one so exceptionally qualified to speak as Mr. W. E. Gladstone, publicly affirmed that it was responsible for more misery in this country than

<sup>1</sup> *God and My Neighbour*, p. 143.

war and pestilence and famine combined. So far however from helping to diminish these evils, *The Clarion* tends to confirm them by sneering at Temperance Reformers and declaring that—

We know that drink is a terrible curse, but incidentally how much is it also a *blessing*. When society's submerged remnants have for ever lost the sight of the bright sun, the blue skies, and the green fields—cooped up in smoky, stench-laden courts and alleys to drudge and slave without one element of pure beauty in all their brutal lives, drink then is a *boon*—fearfully costly it is true, but of *priceless value* as a means of temporary oblivion.

Much of this is sheer bathos, for myriads are cooped up in stench-laden courts and alleys through nothing but drink. To imply that only ill environment causes drink, is utterly false. In Newcastle and Gateshead alone, *every week* £25,000 is spent on liquor which modern medical science declares to be worse than useless—a poison only to be classed with other poisons. How much of this goes to make foul slums? If the share of the 'working classes' in the colossal stupidity represented by our annual drink bill—now only (!) £164,000,000—were stopped and sanely spent, how many stench-laden courts would be left? Meanwhile *Clarion* philanthropy helps 'the trade' by pronouncing its poisons 'a blessing' and 'a boon of priceless value'—thus blessing the curse which more than any other single cause creates both the evil heredity and environment.

## V

## Misrepresentations of Christian Doctrine

**G**ROSS as are the misstatements of Christian fact, they are exceeded in recklessness and untruth by those which refer to Christian doctrine. Either the writer does not know better, or he does. In either case his oft-reiterated 'claim' to teach a 'new philosophy' is discredited. How such things can be printed and circulated to-day, under the guise of truth and sincerity, remains a hopeless problem. Again a few specimens shall suffice. They are only too true types of the many.

On p. 14, speaking of the power given to man by God to create actions by means of volitions, this writer says :

In fact, the power given by God to man, is only another name for the will of God or the power of God ; and if man's acts are ruled or created by the will or power of God, how can God justly punish man for those acts ?

The childish simplicity of this pseudo-argument is as touching as its utter fallacy is transparent. Apparently the writer neither sees nor cares that this assumption reduces man to a mere automaton—and that this, again, begs the whole question at issue. But the query to be



pressed here is, Does the Bible, or does Christian philosophy, anywhere teach this? Or does it give any sanction whatever to such stuff (p. 14) as this?—

If we speak of 'will' or 'power' or 'reason' as a *thing* given to man, we imply that 'will' or 'power' is a *thing outside of man* and not part of him.

That Mr. Chesterton's words (p. 12) to which the above is supposed to reply, do not mean or involve any such nonsense, goes without saying. The pitiful travesty of reasoning, however, which follows on the next two pages, finds fitting climax in the following (p. 15):

Here is a grand conception of an 'all wise,' 'all powerful,' perfectly 'just' God, who creates a man, whom (*sic*) He knows *must* do evil, gives him a guide who cannot make him do well, issues commands for him to act as God has made it impossible for him to act, and finally punishes him for failing to do what God knew from the first he was incapable of doing.

And the world is paying millions of money and bestowing honours and rewards in profusion, upon the learned and wise and spiritual leaders who teach it to believe such illogical nonsense as the above.

Here it will be seen, by the second paragraph, that the writer is not quoting Mr. Chesterton's views, but himself deliberately asserts that the above represents Christian doctrine. What would he say in *The Clarion*, one might ask, if some Christian book deliberately printed concerning Socialism, that it meant universal free love, destruction of all property, and unchecked anarchy enforced with bombs? One may without hesitation assert that such a travesty would be every whit as true as the above quotation.

On the preceding page this writer says, 'Let us be careful to keep our thoughts quite clear and unentangled.' In order to profit by such good advice, we will take, seriatim, each of the clauses which go to make up this total monstrosity of misrepresentation.

'God who creates a man whom  
(sic) He knows *must* do evil.'

Here the writer's own italics do but serve to emphasize a philosophy as faulty as the grammar. The statement is unthinkable, being a contradiction in terms. Not only is there no vestige of warrant in the Bible for it, but divine foreknowledge has no more to do with 'must,' than 'must' has to do with evil. If man were compelled to do anything, it could neither come from divine foreknowledge, nor involve any moral evil.

'Gives him a guide who cannot make him do well.'

Contradiction in terms. No man can by any possibility be made to do well. If he is made there is no moral quality in his action. It is the function of a guide to direct, never to make any one do anything.

'Issues commands for him to act as God has made it impossible for him to act.'

Doubly false. (i) That God made it impossible for man to act aright; (ii) that any command to do the impossible was ever issued to human nature.

'Finally punishes him for failing to do what God knew from the first he was incapable of doing.'

Doubly false. (i) That man was, or is, incapable of doing right; (ii) that God, as represented in the Bible, ever punished, or threatened to punish, any man for not doing what he could not do.

Thus we see that all the 'illogical' nonsense in this statement, is the product of the writer's own prejudiced ignorance or animus. But whilst an unbeliever cannot really be accused of blasphemy, he might be expected to have some regard for truth. To print the above, however, as Christian doctrine, is to leave truth altogether out of account. Not a high recommendation, surely, for a 'new philosophy.'

Unfortunately, we have only to proceed to the next

page (17) to find another assertion of similar philosophical calibre :

But, it may be urged, 'man has a soul.' So! He got that soul from God. God made the soul and fixed its powers for good and evil.

It is the soul, then, that is responsible, is it? But the soul did not create itself, and can only act as God has ordained that it shall and must act.

In the former of these two paragraphs, the last clause is meaningless. 'Fixed its powers for good and evil,' is an ambiguity which is either false or irrelevant. If the meaning be 'compelled it to do good or evil'—that is a contradiction in terms. If 'limited' its powers be intended, that is quite irrelevant, as not being in dispute.

In the latter paragraph the statement is doubly false. No word in the Bible, or in Christian philosophy, justifies such an assertion. The 'soul' that could only act as it was 'ordained,' i.e. compelled to act, would be no 'soul' at all.

Again, on the next page (18) we find the following :

God is 'the first Great Cause,' and how then can God justly punish any of His creatures for being as He created them?

To which it is sufficient reply to say that nowhere in Scripture, or in Christian doctrine, is there the shadow of support for such a reckless misrepresentation. The truth is rather expressed in the quaint, but no less significant words of Eccles. vii. 29, 'Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.' Or, still more plainly in Christ's words (John iii. 19), 'This is the judgement, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light; for their works were evil.'

We might single out numberless other phrases—for the book is full of them—which assert what Christian philosophy never teaches; e.g. p. 20: 'Religion says man is the product of God'—whereas Christianity, at all

events, say§ nothing so loose or misleading. Or, again (p. 40): 'Our Churches attribute the origin of morals to the Bible'—whereas they do nothing of the kind.

But, passing over these lightly, we come, on p. 92, to the following choice assertion :

We must not forget that it is now in the twentieth century that I, an Englishman, am writing this book to plead that men and women, our brothers and sisters, should not be *hated, degraded, whipped, imprisoned, hanged, and everlastingly damned for being more ignorant and less fortunate* than others, their fellows.

Surely, in view of what has been pointed out concerning a previous sentence, the bathos of Determinism could no further go. If this be a fair summary of the doctrine of this book, no other proof is required to show that it is indeed 'not worth the paper it is printed on.' As a representation of Christian teaching or practice such a picture is but a slanderous distortion of the truth.

On the next page, again, we are informed that 'man is a creature of heredity and environment.' Which utterly ambiguous phrase is then expanded thus :

He does not choose his ancestors; he does not choose his environment. How, then, can he be blamed if his ancestors give him a bad heredity, or if his fellow-creatures give to him a bad environment?

The second clause of the first sentence here is manifestly as false as true. For it is unquestionable that to a very significant even if limited extent, a man does choose his environment, and is so far responsible for its influence upon him. That apart, who ever proposes to blame a man for the mere fact that his heredity and environment are influential for ill? No one, with any sense, either in the Church or out of it. Such a platitude is quite redundant. But it is all of a piece with the philosophy which goes on to ask (p. 136):

And how can we expect the badly bred, badly trained, badly taught degenerate to succeed *like* the well-bred, well-trained, well-taught hero?

Well, as matter of fact, there have been in the world's history many real heroes who have neither been 'well bred' nor 'well taught.' But apart from that, does Christian philosophy anywhere teach that we are to expect the same results from a dark and degrading environment, as from the bright and inspiring one?<sup>1</sup> Every one knows that it does not. Then why suggest such a falsity?

One more specimen must here suffice. On p. 187 we read :

As I have said before, every Church, every school, every moral lesson, is a proof that preachers and teachers trust to good environment and not to free will to make children good.

So then because the Churches regard children not as little puppets of heredity and environment, but as developing moral agents, capable of choosing betwixt right and wrong, therefore they must not teach the children anything, on pain of being pronounced inconsistent! Could Deterministic perversity display itself more markedly? Does not every fair-minded man see that it is precisely *because* the children are incipient persons, moral creatures with ever-increasing powers of self-determination, that they should be instructed, both as to their own nature and the use of the unparalleled powers which they possess? The analogue of this prejudiced and superficial suggestion would be, that if a child were born deaf and dumb he should be surrounded with music and speech—but if he were unusually quick and clear in all his faculties, he should be kept in a dark and silent wilderness. Teach a doll, but not a child!

A further note may be made that Christian Churches and parents do *not* trust to environment 'to make children good,' because they know such a thing to be impossible—for it is once again a contradiction in terms.

<sup>1</sup> See Luke xii. 48, &c.

No child on earth was ever *made good* by environment. If any child could be found embodying absolutely nothing but the compulsory result of environment, there would be no more moral goodness in such a result than in an iron casting. If any child is to be 'good,' or to grow 'better,' there must be quite as really the action of the child's personality upon the environment as of the environment upon the child.

In this case, therefore, as in all the others specified, the sneer at the Churches is unjustified. And the final reflection cannot but be, What kind of a 'new philosophy' is this, which can only build itself up by means of wholesale misrepresentations of the principles which it seeks to supplant? There is no need to pronounce sentence. It is sufficiently self-condemned.

## VI

## False Psychology

**A**LTHOUGH, as intimated above, it is not our purpose here to enter elaborately into scientific discussion, it is equally relevant and necessary to point out how this pretentious work abounds in psychological fallacies. These, clad in popular journalistic style, are well calculated to mislead the uneducated or unthoughtful, and are the more mischievous for that reason. Typical specimens of these may be best exhibited under a few key-words.

(1) As to mind. On p. 95 we find this astounding assertion, printed as a complete sentence with all the air of simple infallibility.

The brain is the mind.

The youth who poses as an Agnostic orator in the market-place nods his head approvingly, but the thoughtful reader rubs his eyes. The words still remain, however, and the following appears by way of exposition :

When the brain is diseased, the mind is diseased. When the brain is sick the mind is sick. It is only a figure of speech to speak of the mind and the body as distinct from each other. The mind and the body are one.

So that we do the writer no injustice in taking him at his word in the majestic simplicity of his opening

sentence: 'The brain *is* the mind.' This is confessedly a very lucid popular rendering of 'the sound monistic principle that the human mind is a function of the phronema,'<sup>1</sup> as Professor Haeckel puts it. But it will be at once evident that our author has gone one better than his mentor. The learned Professor was careful to say that mind is 'a function of' the phronema, i.e. the brain. But his eager pupil leaves such finesse behind. It is much more effective to affirm simply that the phronema *is* the mind, and consequently that the mind *is* the phronema. Whence the stream of limpid speech flows on. 'The brain is the mind; the brain is part of the body; the mind and the body are one. It is only a figure of speech to speak of the mind and the body as distinct from each other.'

Leaving all serious estimate of this delightful 'new philosophy' to such experts in psychology as Professor W. James, or Dr. Stout<sup>2</sup>—to whom Haeckel's translator definitely refers us—we may content ourselves here by pointing out, even to the man in the street, that we do at least know that the brain is material, and that the mind is not material. Whence it immediately follows that either the mind is nothing, or the material *is* the immaterial. The choice between these we will leave to him. Perhaps—the mind and the body being one and the same—he will more clearly apprehend the case when he has dined upon an idea, and refreshed his mind with a beefsteak. Meanwhile Dr. Salceby, whose claim to be regarded as a man of science will scarcely be disputed, suggests a very different

<sup>1</sup> *Wonders of Life*, p. 343. Should the reader desire a fair and full examination of the Haeckelian doctrine herein, he will find it in *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 135-96.

<sup>2</sup> If the reader should desire scientific truth in this regard he will find it in Prof. Stout's *Manual of Psychology*, chap. iii., on 'Body and Mind.' He will then be better able to understand how much truth there is in our author's modest allegation, that 'most theologians are opposed to me but most men of science are with me' (p. 20).



view of the case when he affirms<sup>1</sup> that 'The difference between mind and matter is greater than all other differences.' And the true finding of modern psychology is expressed in the words of Dr. Schurman: 'The difference between the ego and the brain is absolute.'<sup>2</sup>

(2) As to will, and more especially free will.

The author starts with the promise to clear up all the 'confusion on this simple subject, in a few words.' But in the twenty pages that follow, the confusions are so many that it would require another twenty pages to exhibit them. We will confine our attention to main points. As an introductory statement we may take the following (p. 170):

The free-will party seem to think of the will as something independent of the man, as *something outside him*. They seem to think that the will decides without the control of the man's reason.

If this writer had told us who constituted 'the free-will party' that talked such nonsense as this, it might have been more to the point. So far, we have only been able to discover his own words, where on p. 13 he tries to foist on Mr. Chesterton sentiments which he cannot but know that 'Freewiller' would reject with scorn.

But we see that man cannot create the thoughts nor cause the actions, until God gives him the power. Then it is not man but the power that creates the thoughts or acts. Then the power is a kind of lord or ruler made by God and put by God over man as a rider is placed upon a horse, or a pilot on a ship. Then man is no more responsible for the acts or thoughts of this ruling power, than a horse is responsible for the acts of a jockey, or a ship for the acts of a pilot.

What Mr. Chesterton thinks of this parody of his sentiments we cannot say, but we can and do aver that to endeavour to father this philosophical twaddle upon

<sup>1</sup> *Harper's*, June, 1905.

<sup>2</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 254.

'the free-will party,' is a proceeding of which any author at once intelligent and sincere ought to be ashamed. Out of a host of fair representatives of the 'free-will party,' we will here only take a couple of witnesses to the psychological truth of the matter. Thus speaks Dr. Seth<sup>1</sup>:

But in the purposive 'I will' each man is real, and is immediately conscious of his own reality. Whatever else may be real, or may not be real, this is real. This is the fundamental belief around which scepticism may weave its maze of doubts and logical puzzles, but from which it is eventually powerless to dislodge us, because no argument can affect an immediate certainty: a certainty, moreover, upon which our whole view of the universe depends.

So, too, Dr. Illingworth<sup>2</sup>:

This is briefly what we mean by free will, and it is a fact of immediate and universal consciousness—that is, of my own consciousness corroborated by the like experience of all other men. The sense of freedom is an immediate part of my consciousness. I cannot be conscious without it. I cannot tear it out. It lies at the very root of myself, and claims with self-evidence to be something *sui generis*, something unique.

Such statements might easily be multiplied. Perhaps the most succinct and sufficient for the present purpose is that of Professor T. H. Green<sup>3</sup>:

The will, then, is not some distinct part of a man, separable from intellect and desire, nor a combination of them. It is simply the man himself, and only so the source of action.

We will take one more specimen, so as to bring in the favourite reference to the stronger motive. Although, as a matter of plain fact, everything of the kind printed in the book before us, has been not only anticipated in the section called 'Determinism' in *God and My*

<sup>1</sup> *Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 46.

<sup>2</sup> *Personality, Human and Divine*, cheap edition, p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. xxii.

*Neighbour*, but categorically and fully answered in the reply entitled *Clarion Fallacies*.<sup>1</sup>

On p. 178, however, we find once again the well-worn platitude that—

In all cases the action of the will depends upon the relative strength of two or more motives. The stronger motive decides the will, just as the heavier weight decides the balance of a pair of scales.

Here we may first compare this latter mechanical representation with what we find elsewhere. True, the contradiction has already been exposed up to the hilt,<sup>2</sup> yet for the sake of the unwary there seems nothing for it but to meet reiteration with reiteration. Elsewhere this writer says that 'will is a word by which we signify the act of choice.' And on p. 171 of this second work he acknowledges that 'the average man can choose and does choose.' Now it is manifestly absurd to talk of a 'balance' choosing anything. If the will means nothing more than the motion of a pair of scales, then there is neither choice nor will in the case at all. The writer has himself previously protested against the notion that the will is something outside or independent of the man. This comes really to the view expressed in Prof. T. H. Green's words above quoted. Hence it is plain that in reducing the action of the will to the mere swaying of a pair of scales, there is no room at all for a genuine volition, that is to say, there is no room for the existence or action of a human self, and the man becomes the mere selfless shell of an automaton, moved any way *ab extra* by heredity and environment, exactly as a marionette upon a stage is made to dance with wires.

This may suit our author's theory, but two things are

<sup>1</sup> In this work pp. 47-105 completely cover the whole ground now under discussion. There is absolutely nothing new to face in this second book, except the ingenuities of superficial plausibility.

<sup>2</sup> *Clarion Fallacies*, p. 69.

abundantly clear, viz. that it is not 'Determinism,' and it is not 'Humanism,' however much these words may be reiterated in print. For the very term 'determine' of necessity connotes ideal, purpose, volition. But not a shred of these exists in automatism. If, moreover, 'human,' as an epithet, has any meaning, it also connotes as a mental certainty, a consciousness of self-determination which is as far from the mere 'balance of a pair of scales' as something is from nothing.

Seeing that this reasonable and true attitude of the 'free-will party' is often pooh-poohed by our author and his friends, it may be well to support it by a couple of quotations, out of many more, from unexceptionable sources. Thus Mr. S. Laing, whose works are spread abroad by the Rationalist Press Association, says :

Some philosophers have come to the conclusion that man and all animals are but mechanical automata, cleverly constructed to work in a certain way fitting in with the preordained course of natural phenomena. But no amount of philosophic reasoning can ever make us believe that we are altogether machines and not free agents. It runs off us like water from a duck's back, and leaves us in presence of the intuitive conviction that to a great extent man is man, and master of his fate. And if this be illusion, then why not everything else—evidence of the senses, experiment, natural law, science, morality, and religion?

With similar candour writes Mr. Joseph McCabe, Haeckel's valiant champion<sup>1</sup>:

That which formerly went under the name of freedom is disproved by science. But the fact remains—and it is a scientific, a psychological fact—that we are conscious of being able to influence our character and our actions, and so we cannot deny our responsibility, within limits.

It would be interesting to see a pair of scales which could, within any limits, influence its own action.

<sup>1</sup> *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, p. 118.

But the play upon one or two other oft-recurring words necessitates our dwelling upon them a moment longer. Says the writer:

When the free-will party say that man has a free will, they mean that he is free to act as he chooses to act.

There is no need to deny that. *But what causes him to choose?*

That is the pivot upon which the whole discussion turns.

Be it so. One would think, from the italics here employed, that something new was being enunciated. But it is merely the reiteration of a fallacy which has been exposed times out of number. To begin with, in regard to the first of these miniature paragraphs, the 'free-will party' do not mean anything of the kind. They say and mean not that a man is free to act, but that he is free to choose his act. The former could only refer to mere physical restraint, the absence of which does not enter into the discussion at all.

Upon the truth or untruth of the question italicized, truly 'the whole discussion turns.' But why does our author here employ an ambiguous word? Especially seeing that the ambiguity covers up the very 'pivot' itself. What is the true significance of this term 'causes'? It is constantly recurring. The next page will supply sufficient typical examples:

He can only choose as his heredity and environment *cause* him to choose.

What *causes* him to wish?

There is a *cause* for every wish, a *cause* for every choice; and every *cause* of every wish and choice arises from heredity or from environment.

A still more innocent-looking form occurs on p. 179:

He can be honest if his nature and his training *lead* him to choose honesty.

But the plain English of all these cases appears elsewhere. We find it typically on pp. 175-6:

To say that Brown is free to choose is a misuse of terms; he is only free to decide as the stronger of two motives *compels* him to decide. And the motives arise from heredity and environment.

Lady Macbeth chose as her overpowering ambition *compelled* her to choose.

Reverting then to the italicized question above, it really stands thus: 'What *compels* him to choose?' And it must be particularly noted that this does not mean the act of choosing between two, but the result of the act of choosing. In full, the question is, what compels him to choose A rather than B? But when thus truly stated, the question immediately answers itself. Nothing compels him to choose. For the simple reason that nothing in heaven or earth can do so. It is a manifest contradiction in terms. A compelled choice is as unthinkable as a round square. If there be choice, there cannot be compulsion. If there be compulsion, it matters not whence, there can be no choice.

This brings us back again to our last quotation, as containing another of the words by means of which the juggling of automatism is performed. A man is only free, we are told, to decide 'as the stronger of two motives compels him to decide. And the motives arise from heredity and environment.' Now it is to be observed that here are two distinct things: (i) existence and influence of motives; (ii) the preponderating force of some motives over others, whereby one motive emerges superior to all the rest, as a compelling reason for so-called choice. Both these merit attention.

(i) No member of the 'free-will party' pleads for motiveless volition. This protest appears to be strangely necessary. Thus Dr. Charles Callaway writes<sup>1</sup>:

Whence comes the force in us which is to overcome both heredity and environment? By the free-will hypothesis, such a force would

<sup>1</sup> *Agnostic Annual*, 1905, p. 17.

be uncaused. A phenomenon without a cause. To such loose thinking does vanity condemn mankind.

Such a style of writing we know is very popular with the Agnostic school represented, but very little reflection is required to make manifest that the 'loose thinking' and 'vanity' belong rather to the writer than to the 'mankind' which declines to consider itself the mere tool of circumstances. Dr. Illingworth's rejoinder is well warranted when he says<sup>1</sup>: 'The freedom of the will then does not mean the ability to act without a motive, as some of its opponents still stupidly seem to suppose.' No 'free will hypothesis' requires a phenomenon 'without a cause.'

(ii) The existence and influence of motives being assumed, the ensuing query is as to their comparative strength. Here, curiously enough, the book before us repeats the error so often exposed,<sup>2</sup> of representing the will as decided by the 'stronger of *two* motives.' Why two? Not only may there be a multiplicity of motives, but in very few cases indeed can a volition be said to result from a difference in strength between only two distinctly isolated motives. Human nature is far from being such a simplicity as that.

The final truth to face, is that some motive so preponderates that the will follows it. Yes, but whence comes this preponderance? If the stronger of two motives 'compels him to decide,' whence the greater strength of one rather than the other? This is the true 'pivot' upon which all turns. It is concerning this, above all else, that we want to know whether it is 'a phenomenon without a cause.' To allege the environment as such a cause is manifestly untrue, because the same environment gives rise to very different results in

<sup>1</sup> *Personality*, &c., p. 24. Many similar testimonies might be quoted, but any further entry into metaphysics is unnecessary for the present purpose. The whole matter will, however, be fully faced in a future work.

<sup>2</sup> See *Clarion Fallacies*, p. 69.

men and women. No one doubts that 'motives *arise* from heredity and environment.' It is not the arising, but the triumphing of one motive over another which requires to be accounted for.

To ascribe this whole difference to heredity, is but to beg the question in dispute. What does heredity really involve? That is the final query to be answered. And it brings us inevitably to the root problem of metaphysics, as Dr. Stout says.<sup>1</sup> Is there a self, or not? Is there, or is there not, an ego which cannot be ultimately explained in terms of molecular vibration? The thoughtful reader must here make his choice. Is it true or sufficient to say that if his heredity and environment compel him, he will think of himself as nothing more than a concatenation of the molecular vibrations that function in the phronema? Or that, since 'the brain *is* the mind,' his doubts herein *are* veritably nothing more than the motions of tiny lumps of matter within his skull?

At least three things may be said hereupon without contradiction: (i) Our own consciousness gives the lie direct to any such materialized automatism.<sup>2</sup> (ii) It cannot be thought or expressed without self-contradiction. No man can say, 'I am the creature'—i.e. mechanical product—of 'heredity and environment,' without implying the opposite of his assertion in the very first term that he employs. (iii) Certainly also there is an end of all moral value to actions if this be true. From this, as we shall presently see, the annihilation of all morality necessarily follows. One would think that, for all self-respecting humanity, such consequences would be sufficiently deterrent.

Meanwhile Dr. Illingworth has summed up the

<sup>1</sup> *Manual of Psychology*, p. 634. 'Will and thought are not explicable by such categories as causality, substance, resemblance, or correspondence.'

<sup>2</sup> 'I am myself the cause of my volitions, and no other cause is needed.' —Dr. W. N. Rice, *Christian Faith in an Age of Science*, p. 293.



situation in words succinct enough and clear enough to merit quotation here. After pointing out, as above, what the freedom of the will does not mean, he continues :

But it does mean the ability to create, or co-operate in creating, our own motives, or to choose our motive, or to transform a weaker motive into a stronger by adding weights to the scale of our own accord, and thus to determine our conduct by our reason.

Self-determination, then, is only another name for free will. But it is a more accurate name, for it implies the necessity of motives, as against mere indeterminism, or liberty of indifference ; while it reminds us that those motives are not mere desires but objects of thought to a self-conscious subject, who as such can distinguish himself from them, and freely decide or decline to make them his own.<sup>1</sup>

Such philosophy commends itself to our intelligence, and enables us to see the fallacy lurking in all the plausible statements in which such terms as motive, choice, desire, &c., are popularly employed. Take but one instance of the last. Says our author (p. 165) :

A man does not drink a liquor he does not like. The desire must be there before his will is put to the test. And the desire is independent of his will.

Which is at once seen to be a statement as irrelevant as commonplace. Not only do men in illness often drink a liquor they do not like, but, even in health, the assumption that men will drink what they desire, is contradicted every day ten thousand times. The 'new philosophy' which is obliged to identify desire with yielding to desire, is as poor an intellectual as a moral guide.

<sup>1</sup> *Divine Immanence*, cheap edition, p. 109.

## VII

## False Moral Philosophy

WHEN, indeed, we come to philosophy, as distinct from psychology, the case for this self-styled Determinism becomes measurably worse. This will be sufficiently exhibited under five heads:

(i) In any alleged process of reasoning, perhaps the greatest breach of propriety is what is termed 'begging the question.' Nothing can either justify this, or make it a rational proceeding. But in the present case we find it to be quite a common occurrence. The following will serve as typical instances:

I base this claim upon the self-evident and undeniable fact that man has no part in the creation of his own nature (p. 10).

If by 'nature' is here meant nothing more than capacity—or potentiality—the statement is a mere truism which does not touch the main issue. But what, at any given moment of his ordinary life, is a man's 'nature'? If really and truly he has had no part in its creation—that is, in its being what it then is—he is manifestly nothing more than the embodiment of heredity and environment. But this is the very thing to be proved, not asserted as 'self-evident.' On the other hand, if in his 'nature,' which in grown-up life must include his character, there is something more than mere

heredity and environment<sup>1</sup>; that something is his own creation, whatever be its potency for good or ill. The real truth here is put by Mr. F. R. Tennant into a succinct sentence which, alike as logic and moral philosophy, is worth many times more than the whole book under discussion :

It follows then that responsibility for the *possibility* of moral evil, and for the opportunities for its realization, lies with God ; responsibility for the *actuality* of moral evil lies with man.<sup>2</sup>

Take, however, another case (p. 14) in this light :

He who creates nothing is responsible for nothing. Man created nothing, man is responsible for nothing.

'Man is responsible for nothing' because he creates nothing. This writer says so. It is necessary for his purpose that it should be so. Therefore it is so. And this is the 'argument' of the 'new philosophy'!<sup>3</sup> When

<sup>1</sup> Compare p. 135. 'The swimmer is something more than a mere heredity. He is a man and he has learnt to swim. Therefore in his battle with the stream of environment, *he is using* heredity and environment.' But if a man uses anything, surely he must be distinct from it. In other words, his nature or character is the result, not of heredity and environment, but of his use of these through all his self-conscious years. Such result therefore is his own creation.

<sup>2</sup> *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, Hulsean Lectures for 1901-2, p. 122. The thoughtful reader who will master this book, will have no more trouble with such difficulties as are raised by *God and My Neighbour*, or its sequel.

<sup>3</sup> It is perhaps advisable, in order to show the state of the writer's mind, to note a couple of other extracts from *The Clarion*. In the issue for April 13, 1906, we read : 'Christ taught a religion of rewards and punishments. I find that all punishment is unjust. I see that Christ was mistaken, and that His teaching is imperfect. I say so.' An oracle, verily !

Again in the issue for September 22, 1905, after asserting that man created nothing, the writer proceeds : 'Therefore man is not responsible for his nature, nor for the acts prompted by that nature. There is no man living who can confute that argument. For three years that argument has stood before the whole religious world and no man has yet dared to meet it. It is unanswerable.' Apart from the foolishness of such rhodomontade, its utter falsity is manifest, beyond comment, to the eyes of any one fair-minded enough to consider any of the replies mentioned above.

Mr. Chesterton rightly asks, 'If God can do all things can He not make man free? Can He not give man the power to create actions as God creates stars?' our author's reply is:

The answer to that quaint piece of reasoning is that it begs the question. For I do not say that God cannot give to man any power He chooses; but that God is responsible and man is not responsible for the nature *and the acts* of any power by God bestowed.

Now mark well the words italicized—not by their author. Is it possible that any man of intelligence and honesty can help seeing that the real question-begging is in these three little words 'and the acts'? Is not Mr. Tennant as above quoted absolutely correct? In a word, if these 'acts' are the merely mechanical actions of an automaton, then God is responsible. But if man is something more than an automaton, viz. a creator of his own acts, then for them God is not responsible, however truly He is responsible for the power with which man does them. To the reader one may earnestly submit that it is this position which is really 'unanswerable.'

We might fill these pages with similar extracts, and the exposure of their fallacies. But in the light of the preceding instances, no comment is required for such expressions as the following, which are truly typical:

I say that there is no such thing as a known law of God. There is no such thing as sin (p. 38).

For a man always acts from temperament which is heredity, or from training which is environment (p. 171).

We may say that the girl is free to act as she chooses, but she does act as she has been taught that she *ought* to act. This teaching, which is part of her environment, controls her will<sup>1</sup> (p. 174).

<sup>1</sup> Possibly the context may be asked for in this case. A young woman is supposed to receive by the same post an invitation to a concert and a request to visit a slum child who is ill. She goes to the latter 'because her sense of duty is stronger than her self-love.' But we have already been emphatically assured that no one is answerable for his or her

The free-will party look upon a criminal as a bad man, who could be good if he wished, but he cannot wish (p. 180).

But let us turn to instances of alleged reasoning and estimate their force. The first we will take from *The Clarion's* extolling of this wonderful book.<sup>1</sup>

Now on what does the case for the Bottom Dog rest? It rests upon a very simple, self-evident truth. What is that truth? I will state it.

It is not just to punish a man for a thing he has not done.

Now let us put the case in full.

It is unjust to punish a man for a thing he did not make.

Man did not make himself.

Therefore it is unjust for God to punish man.

Therefore all divine rewards and punishments would be unjust.

The Christian religion is built upon a system of divine punishments and rewards.

Therefore the Christian religion is built upon a foundation of error.

But is it possible, a sensible reader may ask, that any man should be affected by such a feeble piece of verbal frippery as this? Alas! it is more than possible, it is actual. Numbers of men, who are fascinated by short lines and tiny paragraphs, apparently forget that the strength of a chain is always that of its weakest link, and do not see that one of these apparent links is weaker even than the paper on which it is printed. Let us also 'put the case in full.'

It is unjust to punish a man for a *thing* he did not make.

Man did not make himself.

Therefore—'himself' being only a thing—it is unjust for God to punish *it*.

actions (p. 10). If so, what is the meaning of 'ought,' or 'duty,' in this case? Self-contradiction, however, as we have noted above, does not trouble our author at all. Again, as a matter of fact, is this statement true, that what she has been taught *controls* her will? Rather it is true that, if it be so, teaching ceases to be teaching and becomes compulsion. In which case 'she' does not act at all. It is but a human female puppet moving as pulled by wires.

<sup>1</sup> By the author himself, March 9, 1906.

Of such an argument, and of such a conclusion, may Determinists be proud!

Now let us come to the book again. On p. 193 we read as follows :

Man is not free. Man is compelled to act. Therefore to cease from all action is impossible.

But, it may be said, a man can cease from action; he has power to kill himself.

Well, the earth has power to destroy itself, if it is caused to destroy itself. And man cannot destroy himself unless he is caused to destroy himself.

This is interesting indeed. First, our old verbal friend 'caused' once more does duty for 'compelled.' Secondly, the earth may be 'compelled to destroy itself.' But, apart from matters geological, how even the earth can *destroy itself* if all that happens is destruction *ab extra*, scarcely appears. Thirdly, man and earth are so entirely identical that whatever is true of the one, is also true of the other. But if that be so, then one of these sentences is misprinted. It must either be 'The earth has power to destroy himself,' or 'And man cannot destroy itself, unless it is caused to destroy itself.' Determinists may be left to make their choice—or rather their heredity and environment may be left to 'cause' them to make their choice.

One more instance will suffice. We cannot here transcribe the whole of p. 214, but if the reader has access to it, he is specially requested to read it all. In short, an 'innocent and charming girl' becomes a 'hideous drunken harlot.' The question is, 'how should we feel towards her?' Then we read :

My clerical friend and I would stand before her sick and sorry and ashamed. We should be alike dismayed and shocked; we should be alike touched and repelled.

But there, in that tragic moment, would appear the likeness and the difference between us. He would not *understand*.

The unfortunate woman has been rendered physically and

morally loathsome to us. So has this murderer. But that should cause us to pity and not to hate them; it should inspire us not to destroy them, but to destroy the evil conditions that have brought them and millions as unfortunate as they to this terrible and shameful pass. The bitterest wrong of all is the fact that these fellow creatures of ours have been degraded below the reach of our help and our affection.

Now no one need question that the writer of these sentiments means well. But as a representation of the 'Determinist' case against the Christian, it would be impossible to concoct a paragraph more contrary to fact, or more false in reasoning.

We will not dwell upon the modesty of the word italicized by the author. It may suit his style, but the 'philosophy' that needs such props is poor indeed. There are other matters here that merit attention. (i) 'To us,' the writer says, 'the unfortunate woman has been rendered morally loathsome.' But he only speaks for himself. We can assure him that it will not be so to his 'clerical friend,' for the latter will 'understand,' though he himself does not, that no merely 'unfortunate' woman can ever be 'loathsome' to a Christian, i.e. to a moral mind. There is absolutely nothing to loathe in misfortune. Nor has even a cleric ever been so morally stupid as to feel loathing for that which could not be helped. One might as well talk about loathing the snow because it becomes mud in the streets. (ii) If there be any thing 'morally loathsome' in a prostitute, then the whole contention of this book is gone for ever. She must be and is in that case answerable for her acts. We are assured she is not. Very well. In that case nothing in heaven or earth can make her 'morally loathsome.' She is but a thing as guiltless as her gown. Can any honest man deny this? (iii) When, however, the Christian view makes harlots and murderers morally loathsome, as confessedly it does, what is the reason for saying here that 'that should cause us to pity and not

to hate them'? Of whom is the writer talking? Of Determinists? Certainly not of Christians. There is not a single Christian living, nor has there ever been one, who hates either the murderer or the harlot. Whilst as for pity, from the days of the Christ of the Gospels until now, 'fallen women' have never in the wide wide world found such pity, alike tender and practical, as that which myriads of His disciples have shown and are showing them, every day and every night throughout the year.<sup>1</sup>

(iii) 'It should inspire us not to destroy them.' Who wants to destroy them? Determinists? Assuredly Christians do not. 'But to destroy the evil conditions that have brought them to this terrible and shameful pass.' Terrible in very deed. But where does the 'shameful' come in? Neither the man nor the woman, nor any one else, is answerable for anything said or done. There is, therefore, no more room for 'shame' than when a door creaks, or an organ ciphers.

But 'the evil conditions'? There are no 'evil conditions.' The notion is unthinkable. One might as well speak of sitting on an 'evil' chair, or breathing an 'evil' atmosphere. If it is a question of mere 'conditions,' there is in them no moral quality whatever. If it is a matter of 'evil,' there is something more to be reckoned with besides conditions. What is it? Well, the common sense as well as the moral sense of mankind endorses Christian philosophy, to the effect that it is human personality. And any suggestion to remedy conditions that make for a 'terrible and shameful pass,' without reckoning with it, are as fatuous as all attempts to bale out the sea. If the poor girl here contemplated

<sup>1</sup> Probably nothing is easier to-day than criticizing the Salvation Army; but whatever its faults may be, it has, amongst other myriad agencies, 120 Homes for the rescue of 'our fallen sisters.' Has unbelief in all its history any similar record of 'pity'? To say nothing of the incalculable and ceaseless efforts of Christian Churches throughout the land.



is a type, how will prostitution be prevented? By giving a fair income and a fine house to every man? But the men who bring poor girls to this pass have that already, and in almost all cases have a great deal more. Pampered luxuriousness and selfish laziness have very much more to do with peopling the streets at midnight, than poverty or unemployment. How does the writer propose then to 'destroy' such genuinely evil conditions! By telling the libertine and the lustling, who care nothing for either body or soul of 'our sisters' whom they ruin, that no one of them is responsible for what he does! So the gilded masher and the well-groomed prodigal may take her and abuse her, and fling her to shame and misery and disease, but no one of them must be blamed or punished for anything he does. What does all that is best within us say to such a doctrine? Surely, not only that it is a doctrine of devils, but that all talk about destroying evil 'conditions' on such terms, is as devoid of sense as it is of morality.

(iv) Yet once more. 'The bitterest wrong of all is the fact that these fellow creatures of ours have been degraded below the reach of our help and affection.' Again the author writes as a Determinist. Of such this may be true. But as to Christians it is utterly false. 'Beyond our help and affection'! Why, even Nietzsche knew better than that. As a matter of fact, the help and the affection of Christian workers go out tenderly and practically towards 'these fellow creatures of ours' more in one week, than all the philanthropy of Godless civilization combined in a century. Such ceaseless and tender-hearted seekers of the lost, however, hold that the men, who herein are the most real sinners, are responsible for their actions. If they are not, it is nothing but verbal cant to talk about the 'bitterest wrong of all.' For there can then be no 'wrong' anywhere, or under any circumstances.

So much for ostensible argument. A few words must

be added concerning moral philosophy in general, and conscience in particular.

As to the former, a curious statement on p. 11 gives us an idea what to expect :

If God created *all* things, He must have created the evil as well as the good.

Who then is responsible for good and evil? Only God, for He made them. He who creates all is responsible for all. God created all. God is responsible for all.

Nothing could more clearly show the obliquity of the author's vision, than the fact that with such evident satisfaction he has italicized the word 'all.' As if the truth or falsity of his assertion turned upon that ! Is it really necessary for us to print the word 'things' in capitals, in order to make him and his friends see that in morals we are concerned with quality, not with quantity? If God had created a thousand universes, all full of *things*, He could not have created evil. For the simple but sufficient reason that moral 'evil' cannot by any possibility be created.

The misleading superficiality here is, indeed, two-fold. First, no 'thing' can, under any circumstances, be evil, any more than a stinging-nettle can be vicious. Secondly, even in persons, evil cannot be created *ab extra*. It can only be created from within. If there is no original action of the self, there is no evil. But in the very degree in which it is original action, God is not and cannot be responsible for it. Such a suggestion involves manifestly a contradiction in terms. Thus we are brought back once more to Mr. Tennant's true and abiding distinction as above quoted. No other reply is really required, for a reasonable and sincere mind, to the whole of the boastful tirade printed in *Not Guilty*.

But what can be said of any philosophy which sweeps away at one stroke, all distinction between the moral and the physical?

It is with moral as with physical evils. When an epidemic of fever or smallpox comes upon us, we do not punish the sick nor blame them.

Therefore, if we have an increase of lying, or theft, or lust, or murder, we must not blame any one. We must 'attack the cause of the sickness.' And the cause of the moral is precisely the same as the cause of the physical evil—as physiological, as mechanical, as external! Thus, once more, the whole matter in dispute is begged, and man's whole moral nature goes by the board.

But, further (p. 243), we are told that—

The Christian does not know, cannot teach, what honesty is, because he does not know. He cannot attack the causes of vice and crime, because he does not understand that vice and crime are caused.

The man in the street is doubtless impressed by the air of infallibility which pervades such assertions. Its exquisite modesty escapes him. But the Christian certainly knows better than to be misled by the convenient ambiguity of the favourite word 'caused.' The only sense here, consistent with the rest of the book, is 'compelled.' And the Christian, at least, knows that to talk about compelled vice, or crime, or honesty, is sheer nonsense.

The kind of moral philosophy which becomes most popular, and wins for the writer the reputation for wise sympathy,<sup>1</sup> is well expressed on the same page :

We should attack the environment which made the man a criminal and is still making more criminals, and we should try to alter that environment and so prevent the making of more criminals.

Upon which two remarks have to be made. (i) To suggest this with all the air of a new discovery, is as childish as it is untrue. Ages ago the apostle Paul

<sup>1</sup> 'I am generally known as a poor man's advocate' (p. 247).

wrote to the Corinthians: 'Do not deceive yourselves. Evil companionships corrupt good morals.'<sup>1</sup> But both the apostle and Menander, from whom he quoted, had too true knowledge of human nature, and of morality, to suppose that the corruption either came from, or could be cured by, environment alone. For which reason Paul added, 'Live righteous lives and cease to sin: for some have no knowledge of God; I say this in order to move you to shame.' But if criminals are made by environment, in the same way as table-legs are made by saw and lathe out of wood—seeing that no man can help doing anything he does—then, of course, 'shame' would be as impossible for a man as for a draper's dummy.

Hence (ii) criminals are not and cannot be made, any more than cured, by environment. No man who is 'made' to do anything is a criminal, any more than the revolver with which a murder is committed is a criminal. The worst man that the worst environment can *make* would be but an unfortunate animal, a creature incapable of acting upon the environment which was acting upon him. Such creatures, experience and observation alike show that men are not. Indeed, nothing is more flatly contradicted in human life, than the bald assertion that a good environment makes a good man. When everything is fairly considered, all our really worst criminals come from good environments. It is just this which constitutes the essence of their criminality. Multiplied facts to such effect being too manifest to admit of contradiction, Determinists have to call heredity to their aid in their determination to get rid of a moral self, which can act for and by itself, and so be held accountable for its actions. But self-consciousness joins hands with common sense and conscience, to repudiate such sophistry. For it simply amounts to the annihilation of human personality.

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 33 (Weymouth's trans.).

Upon the unthinking, impression is also made out by such sentences as this (p. 244) :

For ages the Christians trusted to religion to rid them of pestilence. Science taught them to prevent pestilence. Now they trust to religion to rid the world of vice and crime. It is the same old error. Science has shown us the causes of vice and crime ; science teaches us that we must attack the causes.

Here, again, we note the pseudo-moral philosophy which calmly assumes that moral evil is in no respect different from physical disease. A pestilence and a crime are one and the same thing—to which the simple but true reply at once is that in every such case we are merely juggling with words. If the moral be no more, no other, than the physical, then there is no moral: all is physical. Whence it follows that love and hate are absolutely nothing more than heat and cold ; selfishness and malice, lust and greed, are in no respect whatever different from hunger and thirst, disease and health. Does science teach that ? Most assuredly it does not. More than that here we need not say, unless it be to echo, in a sense opposite to his intention, the words of our author : ‘ But the world is very ignorant in affairs of moral sanitation, and has an almost religious veneration for the sacredness of Grand Ducal ducks.’ For even the snobbery not seldom associated with hide-bound conservatism in society, is more tolerable than a ‘ new philosophy ’ which assures snob, seducer, rack-landlord, thief, sweater, wife-beater, fop, hypocrite, hooligan, swindler, murderer, alike, that they cannot help it. No fault is to be found with them. They are not answerable for anything they do. Can moral insanity further go ?

It only remains, under this section, to add a brief note upon this writer’s misrepresentations concerning conscience. Logically speaking, there is, of course, neither room nor need for such consideration. If a man is not answerable for anything, manifestly he cannot

have a conscience at all. In such case the conscience of a cabbage would be just as valid as that of a man. But we have to deal with facts, and the appreciation of facts. Conscience in human nature being undeniable, Determinists are necessarily determined to explain it away. The trick is performed in two ways. One is, to discourse as this writer does upon 'the origin of conscience'—i.e. to trace it back by means of evolution to nothing but 'the mechanism of the atom,' as Professor Haeckel puts it. The other is to muddle and misrepresent the meaning of conscience, and condemn it as useless for not doing what it never professes, nor can be reasonably expected, to do. In both of these performances, the book before us greatly excels.

(i) As to the origin of conscience. Upon this, however interesting a theme, we need not dwell at length, because for our present purpose it is irrelevant. As Dr. Illingworth says, 'The truth of astronomical discoveries is not affected by the fact that the faculty which makes them could not formerly count four'—any more than the validity and value of Newton's *Principia* is called into question, because when its author was born he was one of the smallest of human babes. Neither simplicity of origin nor slowness of development has anything to do with the present factual reality of conscience in normal human beings. The testimony of all literature—including historians, poets, dramatists, writers of fiction, and journalists<sup>1</sup>—to this reality is too manifest and multiplied to need quotation. As long as

<sup>1</sup> This involves the whole significance of the events recorded in newspapers, of which the following may be taken as a type. From *The Daily News* of May 18, 1905: 'A man named John Jackson, a confirmed opium-smoker, but apparently in possession of all his faculties, has made a written confession to the Vancouver police, in which he declares that two years ago he murdered in London a Polish Jewess named Dora Kiernicke.' On the Determinist principle, it was a very foolish thing to do. He could not help murdering her, and was not at all to blame. Yet his conscience gave him no peace, until he gave the lie to such sophistry.

men remain human, the vivid verdicts of Shakespeare, Milton, Browning, Tennyson ; of Scott, Dickens, George Eliot, and Mrs. Humphry Ward, will abide unshaken and unshakable.

(ii) But as to the significance of conscience, the book before us shows how much fog has yet to be cleared away. That a child in a Sunday school should get confused between the form and content of conscience, would not perhaps be surprising ; but that one who so loudly boasts his fitness to introduce a new philosophy should write as follows, is confessedly amazing :

Now I claim that conscience is no more supernatural than is the sense of smell, and no more mysterious than the stomach (p. 149).

To the average artisan that sounds like a bold saying. But the student of science or morals, knows that it is mere bluff. Christian philosophy does not require that conscience should be 'more supernatural' than the power to smell, or more mysterious than the stomach. The function of conscience is not built up on mystery. Mystery, indeed, counts for nothing, because all is mystery.<sup>1</sup> True science does not profess to explain anything. Genuine philosophy acknowledges the need of the divine agency alike in the physical, the intellectual, and the moral realms. Hence the writer's 'claim,' above quoted, is entirely irrelevant.

But what is the meaning of this in the next paragraph ?—

If conscience were what religious people think it is—a kind of heavenly voice whispering to us what things are right and wrong—we should expect to find its teachings constant.

<sup>1</sup> As to the stomach, only absolute ignorance of physiology can treat it, or its function, as a simple and easy matter. Whilst as to the sense of smell, we find that the average human nose can appreciate—to quote Dr. W. B. Carpenter—'in the case of musk, a proportion not greater than one part in 13,000,000 parts of air.' Perhaps there is no mystery at all in this to the editor of *The Clarion*. But what is the use of calling this, any more than the working of conscience, natural ? It merely covers up our ignorance, and leaves the natural as divine as the supernatural.

Possibly some religious people may thus think—just as some other people think that Socialism is a mere device of lazy loafers to rob society. But if this writer deems it necessary to expound the latter by first carefully pointing out ‘what Socialism is not,’<sup>1</sup> why not spend equal care upon conscience, by taking his representation of it from qualified teachers rather than from the lips of the populace? Is there any recognized exponent of the Christian religion who says that conscience is a voice that whispers ‘what things are right and wrong’?—or who defines conscience as ‘an innate knowledge of right and wrong, born with the child’? (p. 165). There is not. The statement is typical of the superficial and confusing plausibilities which constitute the bulk of the book before us. If the reader desires the truth of the matter, he will find it in any respectable Christian treatise. A couple of brief quotations from Dr. W. N. Clarke will here suffice<sup>2</sup>:

Conscience is the judgement of a man applied to his own conduct, affirming that acts for which he deems himself responsible are approved or condemned by his standard of right.

Or, if everything must to-day be had at a ‘popular’ price, either of the two following will suffice to save any thoughtful young man from sacrificing his manhood to the idols of Determinism: *The Compass of the Unknown*, by Alex. Forrow (Partridge & Co., 6d.); *The Conscience*, by Jos. and George Gowan (Elliot Stock, 3d.).

(iii) Thus it is enough for our present purpose to define conscience as the moral consciousness of the normal man. It simply but certainly bespeaks a moral

<sup>1</sup> See *Britain for the British*, cheap edition, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> See his *Outline of Christian Theology*, pp. 199–212, where the reader will find words of sense and soberness. Also Professor Curtis’s *The Christian Faith*, pp. 27–35, where the whole of the sophistries of our author’s chapter on ‘The Origin of Conscience’ are succinctly met on independent lines,



faculty which needs and is open to education, in precisely the same way and for the same reasons as other faculties require training, in order to make the most and best of them. That the reality and value of a faculty in human nature is to be denied because it needs educating, is the discovery of a 'philosophy' which is as false as it is 'new.'

(iv) But what is this moral faculty or moral sense? No query can be more pertinent when it is honestly asked. What answer do we get from our book? p. 165:

A child has no morals; it has only desires. It is only when it is told that to steal sugar or strike its nurse is 'naughty' that it begins to have a moral sense. And its moral sense consists entirely of what it learns—that is to say, its moral sense is memory.

Its moral sense depends upon what it is taught; and its conscience depends upon what it is taught.

And that being so, is it not quite evident that the conscience is not the voice of God, but is nothing more nor less than the action of the memory?

Now, assuming that the writer wishes to be taken seriously, let us weigh his words.

Conscience, we are told, is nothing but memory. Seeing then that he distinctly remembers being taught Calvinism in his youth, why does he now so vehemently repudiate it? His conscience being *nothing* more than his recollection, ought to make him to-day a devoted preacher of election and reprobation. On the contrary we find him loudly proclaiming<sup>1</sup> that he is, on conscientious and moral grounds, highly 'indignant' at Christian claims. Is then indignation nothing but memory? As a matter of fact, such a suggestion is thrice contradicted by the writer himself, within the page on which it occurs. (1) As to the man who was tempted to break his engagement. 'Memory reminds him that he is engaged *and* that it would be *wrong* to follow

<sup>1</sup> *God and My Neighbour*, p. 163, &c.

his desire.' Here the recognition of 'wrong' is manifestly something distinct from, and additional to, memory. (2) Again, we are told that the result is 'a *battle* between memory and desire.' But why a battle? If conscience and the moral sense is *nothing* more than memory, there is no conceivable reason for conflict. Here also the notion that desire *ought not* to be gratified, is entirely outside memory. (3) Further, as to the child's lesson that it is 'naughty' to steal sugar. All that memory brings back afterwards is that it was told so-and-so. But the conception of naughtiness is quite distinct from that memory. If not, there would be no more development of moral sense by such recollection, than from the remembrance of being told that baby brother came from heaven in the doctor's carriage. And (4) if naughtiness is only memory, why not teach the cat that it is 'naughty' to steal fish from the larder? It can certainly remember kicks.

(v) That which looms largest, however, in this writer's indictment of the religious doctrine of conscience, seems to be as follows :

If conscience were really a supernatural guide to right conduct, it would always and everywhere tell man what is eternally right or eternally wrong. But conscience is changeable and uncertain.

The fallacy of the first sentence here has been pointed out above. A moment's reflection shows that the second is equally false. Conscience is *not* changeable and uncertain, anywhere, or in any age. It is absolutely untrue to say that—

Conscience is local; it tells one tale in Johannesburg or Pekin, and quite a different tale in Amsterdam or Paris.

Nor does the usual list—in this case, of course, popularly prolonged—of all the differences as to the thought of what is wrong, which prevail in different climes and under different circumstances, in the least mitigate the

falsity of the position. So too, when we read (pp. 150, 152) that conscience is—

Geographical, it is not the same in one country as another.

Historical, it is not the same in one age as another.

Personal, it is not the same in one person as in another.

Changeable, it alters with its owner's mind.

There are the Nonconformist conscience, the Roman Catholic conscience, the Rationalist conscience, the Tory conscience, the Socialist conscience.

Every one of these statements is false. The whole representation is based upon a palpable confusion between judgement and conscience. The former, i.e. the decision as to what is wrong, is the variable quantity. There is no variation in conscience whatever. It would be just as true to say that the compass varies, because the finger on the disc points to different quarters as the ship turns about. Men not only differ, but ought to differ, as to *what* is right under different circumstances, whether historical, or geographical, or personal. But they *never* differ as to the foundation axiom of conscience, viz. that right is right, i.e. *right* is that which *ought* to be obeyed, to the utmost of our knowledge and power. In this, not only are the Nonconformist, the Romanist, the Rationalist, the Tory and the Socialist, absolutely one, but they actually differ in all their views and conduct *because they are all one* in this. Their consciences are utterly one and the same. They all acknowledge that right should be followed, as far as each man knows it. They would all utterly condemn any man who said it was right to do what he believed to be wrong. All their differences arise concerning what is right and what is wrong. And this is not a matter of conscience at all, but of judgement. When we are told, therefore, that conscience is changeable because it alters with its owner's mind, that which is contemplated is as true and good as that which is said is false. Conscience never

alters with the owner's mind. That which changes is judgement. And this is precisely what ought to change. Both for boy and man alike, right is right and ought to be obeyed. But that which is right for the man, is not necessarily right for the boy. That which was right for the boy, is by no means duty for the man.

By contrast with the plausible confusions, therefore, of this book hereupon, the following words of Dr. W. N. Clarke express the real lesson to be learnt<sup>1</sup>:

The standard of obligation for an individual at any given time is the best that is known to him; for this is the nearest approach possible in his case to the perfect standard. It may be, indeed, that he ought to know something better than he does know, but with this modification (which may often be important) it is true that each man's standard is the best that he knows. The best that he knows is what any man ought to do, and can reasonably be required to do.

(vi) The very fact that this sense of oughtness, as attaching to right, abides undiminished whilst the estimate of the right develops, is the true explanation of the moral sense and the unshakable witness to the reality of something beyond heredity and environment in human nature, to which appeal may be made. This may be sufficiently illustrated from the book before us. Thus on p. 174 we read:

We may say that the girl is free to act as she chooses, but she *does* act as she has been *taught* that she *ought* to act. This teaching, which is part of her environment, controls her will.

Does it? Then, as we have seen above, it is not teaching at all but compulsion, and she does not 'act' at all, any more than the cat's paw acted when the monkey held it so as to get hot chestnuts.

But if the author's italics are justified, if 'she does act as she has been taught that she ought to act,' then (1) she is a good girl; (2) she is perfectly free to do as she

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Theology*, p. 209.

ought to do or not; (3) her conscience tells her that she ought to do what she believes to be her duty; (4) that means that she is answerable for her actions; (5) whence the whole theory of this book is disproved from the writer's own italicized illustration.

Such specimens of self-contradicting fallacy might easily be multiplied, but we will take one more only (p. 236):

Man cannot be blamed; society cannot be blamed. But both can be altered—by environment. That is to say, if heredity and environment have endowed some man with reason and knowledge and inclination for the task, that man may be able to improve society, or the individual, by teaching one or both. And the teaching will be the environment.

He 'may be able.' It is equally true that he may not be able. What is the difference between the two cases? This. In the one case the teaching, assuming it to be right and sensible, will be approved by the judgement of society or the individual, as right; then confirmed by the conscience as obligatory; then obeyed. In the other case, either the teaching will not be approved by the judgement, or the mandate of conscience that being right it *ought* to be obeyed, will be disregarded, stifled, silenced. The latter case shows why, as every one knows who thinks upon it, the best teaching often utterly fails.

And what, finally, is the worth of the assertion that 'man cannot be blamed, society cannot be blamed, but both can be altered—by environment'? The man who cannot be blamed is 'not answerable for his own acts.' In that case he must be treated as having no conscience. That is to say, he must be regarded as having no sense of right or wrong. Furthermore, he cannot be taught it, for that would assume him to be at once answerable for such knowledge, and liable to blame if he did not act upon it. What, then, can environment do for the

creature that neither has, nor can have, any sense of right or wrong? It can only treat him as a lunatic, or an animal, or a thing. It may make him fat or lean, rough or smooth, harmless or injurious, but better it can never make him. How, under such methods, society is to be altered for the better, may be left for Determinism to say.

The following suggestion, at all events, does not show (p. 237) :

Well, the influenza bacillus is poison, falsehood is poison, vice is poison, greed and vanity and cruelty are poisons, and it behoves us to destroy those poisons, and so to improve our social system and the environment of our fellow men.

For, apart from the plain fact that improvement of the environment does not infallibly and of necessity improve any man, the philosophy which puts on the same plane the influenza and vice, shows that it has not even begun to deal truly and intelligibly with the subject. It is no whit more reasonable or sensible, than to call for a hammer wherewith to smash an evil thought. If it be the ancient mistake of piety to think that the diseases due to insanitary conditions could be cast out by prayer, it is a far greater and less excusable modern delusion to suggest that selfishness, and lust, and cruelty, can be destroyed by perfect drainage or comfortable housing. Still less will they be destroyed by treating man as a drain-pipe, or a stained-glass window, a mere unimportant channel of that which passes through him from heredity and environment. This brings us to our next consideration.

## VIII

## Degradation of Human Nature

IN the book, *God and My Neighbour*, it pleases the author to say (p. 186), 'No, I do not want to rob the working man of his faith: I want to awaken his faith—in himself.' Such a purpose sounds very attractive: we have now to examine its true significance. This, in the light of our foregoing scrutiny, it will not take us long to discover. In plain speech, which shall be justified up to the hilt, it amounts to the greatest insult that can be offered to human nature. With sublime effrontery we are informed that—

If you wish to realize the immense superiority of the Determinist principles over the Christian religion, you have only to imagine what would happen if the Determinists had a majority as overwhelming as the majority the Christians now hold.<sup>1</sup>

How powerful an imagination this would require, is manifest the moment we clearly see what this so-called Determinism makes of human nature. This may be learnt first from the figures and illustrations employed. One or two specimens will serve as types.

In the earlier book we read that (p. 19)—

Man could not sin against God any more than a steam-engine can sin against the engineer who designed and built it.

<sup>1</sup> *God and My Neighbour*, p. 143. For reply to the self-contradiction and fallacy involved in this specious flourish, see *Clarion Fallacies*, p. 77.

This style of comparison is fully maintained in the second volume.

But we see that man cannot create the thoughts nor cause the actions until God gives him the power. Then man is no more responsible for the acts or the thoughts of this ruling power than a horse is responsible for the acts of a jockey, or a ship for the acts of a pilot (p. 13).

But a man does not move in a regular path or orbit. Neither does the earth. For every planet draws it more or less out of its true course. And so is it with man ; each influence in his environment affects him in some way.

And we have already noted the further statement which definitely settles the author's perfect satisfaction with this comparison.

The earth has power to destroy itself, if it is caused to destroy itself. And man cannot destroy himself unless he is caused to destroy himself (p. 192).

Now however much—or little—these figures are employed, they are perfectly clear and conclusive as to one point, viz. that, for all purposes of moral philosophy, there is no difference between human nature and steam-engine nature, or ship-nature, or earth-nature. But, beyond all controversy, all these figures represent things, not persons. If, then, the comparison be as fair and sufficient as is necessary for the would-be argument, only one inference is possible, viz. that man also is a thing and not a person. That such a consideration does not, indeed, trouble this author, is manifest enough. Thus on p. 16 we read :

Is there any step in the long march of evolution, any link in the long chain of cause and effect when any one of the things *or* beings evolved by law working on matter and force, could by act or will of their own have developed otherwise than as they did ?

Of course experience answers this as plainly in the affirmative, as Determinism does in the negative. But



the point here is the utter obliteration of any distinction between 'things' and 'beings.' Hence, for this doctrine, persons and things are one. Further references in plenty confirm this conclusion. The importance of the case, and the necessity for clear emphasis will justify repetition of *The Clarion* extract.

God made the soul—soul or man, reason or conscience, responsibility lies with the causer and not with the *thing* caused (p. 18).

Now on what does the case for the Bottom Dog rest? It is unjust to punish a man for a thing he did not make. Man did not make himself. Therefore it is unjust for God to punish man.<sup>1</sup>

The simplicity of this statement is indeed sublime in its demonstration of the thinghood of man. That it is considered perfectly true and satisfactory, is confirmed by the following verse from *The Ballad of the Dying Thief*, also printed and endorsed in *The Clarion*.

Silently knelt the Nurse,  
The Priest sat grim and lean,  
And the *Thing* that had battled for breath to curse  
Lay still on the bed between.

Here, then, confirmed by italics, we have the crown of the 'new philosophy.' Man is a thing. Of course this is implied throughout. It was as patent as latent, for all who had eyes to see, in the former sentence of which the author was so proud that he not only printed it in italics, but repeated it three times more, in the same fashion, on the next few pages.

*If God is responsible for man's existence, God is responsible for man's acts.*

It is a marvellous phenomenon that any sensible reader should ever be caught by such a transparent sophistry.<sup>2</sup> It is equally pitiful, for a more question-

<sup>1</sup> *Clarion*, March 9, 1906.

<sup>2</sup> For complete exposure see *Clarion Fallacies*, p. 51.

begging clause was never put into print. A moment's reflection shows that it is absolutely dependent for its semblance of reasoning upon the assumed thinghood of man. Any child can answer it, 'without the least hesitation.' If man be but a thing, God is responsible. If man be man, God is not responsible. For the creature that cannot sin, is not man at all, but only a bipedal automaton, i.e. a thing. The 'faith in himself,' therefore, to which this writer wishes to awaken the working man, is, that he is not a working man at all, but merely a working thing.

The case is put with refreshing plainness by M. Hamon :

The rock which in breaking away crushes whoever is on its path, is not considered responsible. Nor is the tiger responsible who kills and eats a man. We ought no more to consider the man who acts responsible, for he is as much an automaton as the tiger or the rock.<sup>1</sup>

Thus we arrive at the final truth. Man is an automaton, and the 'new philosophy' is Automatism. That this is the real description, and that the term Determinism, like many others in modern unbelief, is assumed without right, i.e. stolen, is well put by Professor Lloyd Morgan when he says : 'There is determinism all along the line, but it is the self which determines.'<sup>2</sup> Thus the Christian is the true Determinist.

No greater insult can possibly be offered to human nature than to treat it as a thing. Let any one seriously ask a fond mother with a new-born babe what she intends to do with 'that thing,' and he will meet with a forceful rejoinder from an old philosophy which is as much more true as noble than the new.

Compared, moreover, with the degradation of human nature by this philosophy of Automatism, the honour

<sup>1</sup> *The Illusion of Free Will*, p. 134.

<sup>2</sup> *Contemporary Review*, June, 1904, p. 794.

put upon man by the gospel which pronounces him a sinner is immeasurable. Every sinner, however lost or depraved, is a potential saint. In order to be a sinner, he must first be a man, and not a thing. Out of a world of sinners there may at least emerge, through repentance, resolution, effort, creatures exhibiting goodness, purity, nobility, heroism, self-sacrifice. But a crowd of automata can never by any conceivable process become more than things, concerning which it must for ever be sheer absurdity to predicate virtue, or truth, or goodness, or character of any kind.<sup>1</sup> There are, confessedly, far too many things to sadden and depress us in our streets. But it would be infinitely sadder and more hopeless if we had to think of civilization as but a huge asylum, in which no one of the sub-human inmates is responsible for anything he says or does—or as a mere stage on which soulless puppets simply dance as they are pulled.

Verily it is a noble 'new philosophy' which gives men the choice of being accounted either things or lunatics.

<sup>1</sup> Thus Dr. Rudolph Otto well says in his recent and valuable work, *Naturalism and Religion* (p. 321): 'If naturalism be in the right, thought is not free, and if thought be not free there can be no such thing as truth, for there can be no establishing of what truth is.'

## IX

## The Destruction of Morality

NOTHING is more indignantly repudiated by Automatists—for this name, being the true one, must now henceforth be adopted—than the suggestion that morality will suffer at their hands. Besides the logical fact that all such indignation is self-contradictory, there is this practical ground for such repudiation, as we shall in a moment see, that no one of them is true to the creed they so loudly proclaim. But as to the creed itself, nothing is more manifest than that whenever and wherever it is maintained, there must be an utter end of all morality. Strong protests, of course, are made against this finding, and desperate efforts are made to save the situation.<sup>1</sup>

They all admit of being dismissed in a sentence, but before doing so, in order to show fullest justice to the book in hand, we will face its main assertions. At the outset (p. 10), we were informed categorically that 'men should not be classified as good and bad, but as fortunate and unfortunate.' In *The Clarion* the same sentiment is thus phrased: 'There are no good and no bad. There are sick and well, strong and weak.' Then, if this is to be taken seriously, one is bound to reply that

<sup>1</sup> Should a student read these lines and desire a specimen, he will find one in *The Agnostic Annual* for 1905, in an article by Dr. Callaway entitled, 'Does Determinism Destroy Responsibility?' In which not only is every page crowded with fallacies, but the writer completely gives away his whole case at the end by the avowal that 'Scientific Determinism teaches that our wills are not forced by an external power, but are regulated by our own consciences.' It would be interesting to hear how the conscience of a 'steam-engine' (see *God and My Neighbour*, p. 19) regulates the work of the piston.

if there are no good and bad, there is no right and wrong. For the good man is neither more nor less than the man who does right, and vice versa. But if there be no right and wrong, assuredly there is no morality. For whatever any dictionary may say, the true and only valid definition of morality is the doing of right, as against the doing of wrong, which is immorality.

Against this plain truth it is quite irrelevant to allege that 'morality is the result of evolution, not of revelation' (p. 58). For certainly, as regards Christian philosophy, no one has ever said that morality is the result of revelation. Indeed, when attention is paid to the meaning of words, such a thing is unthinkable. Morality is the practice of right, and a revealed practice is an absurdity. Moreover, the method by which the moral faculty has reached its human stage, does not here concern us, as we have already seen in regard to conscience. The real question is, whether there is in man a moral faculty, and if there be, whether he is through its possession rendered responsible, or not, for what he says or does. Beside this main issue, all other considerations are trifles. No one knows when self-consciousness develops in a human babe. No one need inquire. The great matter for concern is whether, in after years, the babe becomes a self-conscious, self-determining moral agent, or merely an animal automaton. This main issue is never faced in the book before us, any more than it is generally in the doctrine of Automatism. We will consider sufficient instances to show how its positions are divided between evasions and impossibilities.

On p. 39, the writer not only adopts, but emphasizes with italics, the following definition of morals from Crabbe's *Synonyms*: 'By an observance of morals we become good members of society.' This is very interesting from one who has just deliberately and emphatically declared that there are no good members of society.

Untroubled, however, by such trifles of self-contradiction, he proceeds :

The italics are mine. Morals are the standard of social conduct. All immoral conduct is anti-social, and all anti-social conduct is immoral.

If there were only one man in the world, he could not act immorally, for there would be no other person whom his acts could injure or offend.

As to what morality is, I claim it is the rule of social conduct; the measure of right conduct between man and man; and I shall build up my whole case upon the simple moral rule that every act is immoral which needlessly injures any fellow creature (p. 45).

Avowedly these words give us a fair statement of the author's doctrine. But the main point upon which really the 'whole case' turns, is simply evaded. Let us endeavour to make it clear.

(i) It will be at once seen that the second paragraph in the above extract, calmly begs the question. It simply assumes that there is no God against whose law a man might offend. Also, even if there were, that man could not sin—to say nothing of the possibility of a man's sinning against himself. All this can only amount to one result, viz. the conclusion that there is no self, either to do wrong or to be wronged. Thus, once more, a man becomes the mere puppet of heredity and environment.

Now, in such case, what becomes of the first statement here made? We read of 'social conduct' and 'anti-social conduct.' But where and how does 'conduct' come in at all? Is a puppet capable of conduct? Can we ask or expect a doll to behave itself? If a father brings home for the delight of his children a clockwork man of tin, and having wound it up sets it going on the table, can its movements rationally be termed its 'conduct'? Surely the children would be competent to answer that question. In a word, 'conduct' on the part of a mere 'creature of heredity and environment' is simply impossible. It is as irrational as to talk of the bad conduct

of a clock that does not keep time. And where conduct is impossible, morality is at an end.

Or take the last of these paragraphs. The essence of morality, we are told, is 'needless injury' of a fellow creature. But what does this needlessness involve? It is but one more of the rolling stones upon which this new philosophy rests. First, it must be noted that the word 'needless' is ambiguous. It points two ways—forwards and backwards; but in neither way does it help the new morality. To speak of 'needless injury,' so far as the injured is concerned, is manifestly tautologous, for all injury is unnecessary for any creature. When the author adds, 'I say needless injury, for it may sometimes be right and necessary to injure a fellow creature,' he simply contradicts himself. That which it is right and necessary to do for any man, cannot possibly be an injury. It is a boon, however much pain it may give him. If a major surgical operation had to-day to be performed without chloroform, it would yet certainly be a benefaction, not an injury, supposing it to be 'right and necessary.'

Thus we are really driven to think of a 'needless injury' as referring to the doer of it, not to the sufferer. And a needless injury is one which need not have been done, because the doer of it was not compelled to do it. That is to say, he ought not to have done it, because it was injurious, and because he was free not to do it. Which is exactly what Christian philosophy—and common sense—teach. But it is flatly contradictory to all foolish talk about a man not being answerable for anything he says or does, on the ground that (p. 202) what he does, at any given moment, is 'the only thing he could do.' In that case all injury would be necessary. But it would at the same time cease to be injury at all. For the very notion of injury connotes the conviction that it is something which ought not to be done.

The same evasion of the real point is found in the definitions of sin, crime, and vice, with which the chapter on 'The Beginning of Morals' begins (p. 38).

Sin is disobedience of the laws of God.

Crime is disobedience of the laws of men.

Vice is disobedience of the laws of nature.

We may dismiss with a smile the air of papal infallibility with which the first of these is swept out of consideration. 'I say that there is no such thing as a known law of God. There is no such thing as sin.' For it matters nothing whether we think of laws of God, or of man, or of nature, until we know what 'disobedience' means. And the plain question which lies at the root of all else, and must therefore be met without equivocation, is this: If a man be not 'answerable for his own acts,' is *disobedience* possible to him under any circumstances? To which the answer is manifestly, No. To a creature whose every action is 'automatic'—seeing that (p. 202) whatever he does is 'the only thing he can do at the instant when he does it'—obedience and disobedience are alike impossible. For the very essence of obedience is conscious, i.e. voluntary action.

Hence, M. Hamon, writing as a Determinist, gives this as a 'complete definition' of crime: 'Crime is every *conscious act* which injures the liberty of action of a similar individual.'<sup>1</sup> But if a man be so helpless a 'result' of heredity and environment that whatever he does is the only thing he can do, there is no 'conscious act' at all. An automaton does not 'act' under any circumstances. It is ever and always merely acted on by the forces which move it. Hence no man, according to the new philosophy, ever really acts at all. He is merely under the illusion that he is acting, whether apparently obeying or disobeying any laws whatever. He is but a thing, with an imaginary power to choose

<sup>1</sup> *Illusion of Free Will*, p. 63.



and will. To such a mere fraction of automatic animality, disobedience is as impossible as to a walking-stick. 'Crime' cannot, under any circumstances, be committed. But where crime is unthinkable and disobedience impossible, certainly morality is at an end. Responsibility to the community is, under such conditions, every whit as inconceivable as sin against God. From such a standpoint truly 'there are no good and no bad.' Consequently there are no moral and no immoral. Criminals and saints are one.

We know now, therefore, how to estimate the summary here printed (p. 44), which to many, doubtless, will appear to be sublime in its simplicity and brevity :

True morals are all founded on the rule that it is wrong to cause needless injury to any fellow creature.

It is indeed too simple altogether. For besides the redundancy of the term 'needless,' and the utterly unproved and unwarranted rejection of responsibility to a divine law, it is at once and for ever sufficient to point out that a mere 'creature of heredity and environment,' whose every act is 'the only thing that he can do,' never, under any circumstances, is the 'cause' of anything. He cannot possibly 'cause' injury to any one. He can only be the helpless channel through which suffering comes to others. To talk about his doing 'wrong' is, therefore, as senseless as to accuse a telephone of wrong-doing if some man should use it for the conveyance of vile language.

The same applies directly to this writer's avowal that he 'broke from the teaching of his youth, and came to see that all wrong-doing sprang from selfishness' (pp. 41, 47, 48). This he afterwards elaborates ;

Is it not clear that these acts are held to be good because they are felt to be unselfish ?

Now I make bold to say that in no case shall we find a man or a woman honoured or praised by men when his conduct is believed to be selfish. It is always selfishness that men scorn.

The last sentence is undoubtedly true. Not much boldness is required for its enunciation. But it is passing strange that the writer should appear not to see that it scatters to the winds the whole theory on which he expends his book. For we have here a fact and a reason for it. Both alike are flatly contradictory to the Automatism which he christens Humanism.

Men scorn selfishness. And this writer endorses their attitude. But we are elsewhere assured, *ad nauseam*, that 'no man can under any circumstances be justly blamed for anything he may say or do.' But if 'scorn' be not blame, what on earth is? Scorn is the intensest possible form of blame. Thus we find in the 'new philosophy' the very same action condemned on one page and approved on another.

But why do men scorn selfishness? On the preceding page (47) we read that 'The moral is that selfishness is bad, and unselfishness is good.' But if, as this writer insists, there are no good men or bad men, how, in any man, can selfishness be bad or unselfishness good? Suppose that there are some selfish or unselfish people known to us, how are we to think of them? They are not good or bad, they are 'fortunate or unfortunate.' The selfish man is, of course, the unfortunate man, and the unselfish is the fortunate. In that case why should the one be scorned and the other praised? Scorn a man for being unfortunate! Is that morality? Why this is the very thing upon which the writer himself pours his bitterest scorn (p. 92): 'I am writing to plead that our brothers and sisters should not be hated, and damned for being less fortunate than others.' Surely a new philosophy that can play fast and loose like this, becomes itself an object of scorn.

But why, we must repeat, why is selfishness bad? It is a question that must not be shirked. Let the author himself reply. 'What is the common assay for moral gold? The test of motive.' Good. We will accept

that, and proceed to apply it. Ahab's motive in getting Naboth murdered was that he wanted the latter's vineyard. What for? To enjoy himself therein. Does such conduct, then, deserve to be scorned, as being cruel selfishness? Most men of common sense and moral feeling will say, Yes. And even this philosophy is compelled for very shame to contradict itself and join in the scorn. But in so doing it contradicts itself yet again. For Ahab could not help it. He did 'the only thing he could do.' What, then, about his motive? Oh, he was but the slave of his motive, for 'the will always follows the strongest motive.' What, then, scorn a man for being a slave! Is that morality? The test of moral worth is motive; but motives are despots, and the victim of such tyranny is not to be blamed. Then why talk of selfishness, when there is no self to be selfish? As well call an engine-whistle selfish for deafening us in a railway station. Motive, or no motive, the selfishness that cannot be helped, is but another of the round squares so freely provided by this new philosophy.

What, moreover, are we to make of this? (p. 43):

One of the first faults men would brand as immoral would be cowardice.

But such blame would only show their ignorance. For what is a coward? A man who runs away? But if that is 'the only thing he could do,' why should he be branded as immoral for doing it? Oh, but 'we Determinists do not denounce men; we denounce acts.' So? Then it is the running away, altogether apart from the man, which is immoral. This is doubly interesting. (i) How, one may venture to ask, did the running away come to pass without the man? (ii) Apart from the man, running is but an abstract notion, a mere conception. So then we have an immoral conception! Truly a wondrous creation of the new philosophy. Common sense will ask not only what the coward did,

but why he did it. And any schoolboy will answer. He ran because he was afraid. And the wrong of his cowardice was that he *ought* not to have allowed his fear to overcome his sense of duty. He, being a man and not a thing, put himself before his duty. For that, men scorn him. He ought to have done otherwise, because he could have done otherwise. If he could not, there was neither selfishness nor room for scorn.

But it is useless to continue such scrutiny. The whole matter, as was intimated above, admits of being put as succinctly as truly. Let us take that *Clarion* verse once more :

And the Thing that had battled for breath to curse  
Lay still on the bed between.

Pray what is gained for the new philosophy by printing Thing with a capital letter ? Can all the capital letters of earth's alphabets endow a *thing* with the power to *curse* ? Most assuredly they cannot. So far as morality is concerned, 'the thing' no more 'lay still' after death than before. Morally it never existed.

So, again :

Repent ? Is mine the fault ?  
The son of a thief by a pimp !  
If He builded me crooked and halt,  
Say ! Whose is the blame if I limp ?

Strange that in these days any sane man should find any difficulty in distinguishing truth from falsehood in such specious sophistry as this. The 'blame' is to be divided between the thief and the pimp ; for their evil habits and ungoverned lusts brought 'the thing'—if it was only a thing—into existence, and cursed it both before and after birth. But apart from such side issues, the point here is, that no amount of 'breath' whatever can enable a 'thing' either to curse or to bless.

If under no circumstances whatever a man is to be blamed ; if he is not answerable for his own acts ; if

everything that he does is at that instant the only thing he can do, then it is sheer abuse of language to talk about 'he' at all. There is no 'he' left. All that is left is an 'it,' which can no more be moral or immoral than the wheel of a motor-car.

The confusion and self-contradiction of the new philosophy in this respect, requires only such illustration as we find on pp. 21 and 165.

How can we blame the new-born or unborn baby for the nature and arrangement of the cells—which are *he*?

Answer: (i) No one with any sense, let alone any religion, ever did such a foolish thing. To represent this as Christian doctrine is either gross ignorance or equal dishonesty. (ii) To say that any arrangement of cells are 'he'—with italics—shows an utter ignorance of psychology. The notion suggested is as contrary to science as to experience. (iii) No new-born or unborn baby is a 'he' at all, or ever can be until its self-consciousness is developed. But when it becomes a child, as distinct from a baby, then the common sense of mankind ceases to speak of 'it' and thinks of or refers to 'him' or 'her.'

What, then, is the meaning of this?—

A child has no morals. *It* has only desires. If *it* likes sugar *it* will take sugar. And *its* moral sense consists entirely of what *it* learns.

That is to say the 'unborn baby' is a 'he'—a moral being; but the grown child is an 'it'—a thing that 'has no morals'! Which statement is the more false, it would be difficult to say. But the two together, in the same book, show the working of a mind which charity forbids to characterize. As for the 'philosophy' of the case, it is ended in a word. The man who is 'not answerable for his own acts' must be a lunatic, or a brute, or a thing. In no such case is morality even thinkable.

## X

## Utter Impracticability

THE question whether a doctrine can be put into practice, or not, is manifestly one of great importance. Anti-Christians have long employed it as a favourite method of attacking Christianity. The assertion that there are no real Christians has, we know, been often and loudly made. Its answer may be left to other occasions. All that need be noted here, with even greater confidence, is that there are no Determinists, in the sense of the book before us. This may be expressed in language taken from a quarter where any sympathy with Christian principles is out of the question. Says *The Freethinker* (October 19, 1906):

Mr. Blatchford cannot refrain from praise and blame any more than Mr. Thomson can. We could give a hundred instances. But there is no need to give one, for we are stating a truism. Now if the opponents of praise and blame cannot help indulging in them, if their instincts are against their principles, they would do well, would they not? to reconsider their position. It is no use preaching what cannot be practised.

The words of Mr. Thomson here referred to were written in reference to Mr. R. Bell, M.P. They are as follows :

We have the right to claim that if he cannot justify his charge he shall withdraw it. If he does neither, not even pity for his humiliation will save him from the *contempt* which all right-thinking men must feel for wilful and unscrupulous slanderers.

In which two things cannot escape notice: (i) That to say one moment no man is to be blamed for anything, and the next assert that he is to be treated with 'contempt,' is just as self-contradictory as all the other cases we have pointed out above. It is really ridiculous. (ii) The unreasonableness of contempt, in such a case, is equally manifest. For, whatever Mr. Bell's words or deeds may have been, and however displeasing to *The Clarion* staff, at least, upon their own showing, he could not help them. What he did was 'the only thing he could do.' But to pour contempt upon a man for what he could not help, is quite as bad as to abuse a cripple in the street for being a cripple. Which if a Christian did, in the presence of the editor of *The Clarion*, he—and probably the public—would soon hear of it.

Of this there can be no doubt, seeing that the author of *God and My Neighbour* expressly says, as we have already seen, that he joins his voice 'to the indignant chorus which denies' the claims of Christianity. The denial we can understand. But the indignation, when no man, and therefore no poor Christian, is to be blamed for anything, is surely out of place. Beyond all question indignation is blame. But, here, on this book's own principles, it is no more reasonable than to be indignant at one's bicycle-tyre for getting punctured.

Seeing, however, that the automatic blamelessness advocated by the new philosophy is not practised by those who promulgate it, we need not waste time in looking elsewhere to see if it would work in any home, or school, or city, or nation. One can, indeed, without much effort, imagine what would be the fate of a Labour candidate for Parliament at the next election, who should solicit the votes of any constituency on these lines. The election address would be interesting reading. It might run somewhat in this style :

Ladies and Gentlemen,—In doing myself the honour of soliciting your vote, I beg to assure you that whilst I am in favour of all

worthy Democratic principles, in the event of my being returned as your Representative, I cannot be held answerable for anything I may say or do in the House. But I assert with the utmost confidence, that everything I do will be the only thing I could do under the circumstances which may prevail.

It would not take very long, one may safely prophesy, to count his votes.

But the doctrine that cannot be practised even where it is most preached; the principle that no schoolmaster would for a moment think of adopting in training children; the philosophy that the politician would no more think of acting upon than the Christian teacher would, is sufficiently condemned without more ado. In very deed it 'is not worth the paper it is printed on.'

It is said that when, as often, the officials of the Patent Office at Washington are pestered with theorists who wish to take out a patent for some scheme of perpetual motion, they never argue, but simply require each applicant to bring a working model. The candidate goes away indignant. But he never returns. When automatists of the *Not Guilty* type produce a community, or a school, or a home, or a newspaper, actually conducted on their principles, such a 'new philosophy' may meet with respectful treatment. Until then it merits only pitiful contempt.



## XI

## Greatest Hindrance to True Philanthropy

THE last chapter in the book here examined is entitled 'The Defence of the Bottom Dog.' It would be difficult to find a stranger mixture in modern literature. Vivid sketches of human nature; fervid pleadings for the unfortunate; reiteration of wild 'claims' that are as illogical as irrelevant, or else manifestly false; pathetic appeals to tender-hearted men and women; glib jibes at those who dare to differ from the writer; wholesale self-contradiction in the light of the preceding pages, intermixed with summaries from science and history, and permeated with a philanthropy which is well and truly based upon the rights of democracy,—was ever such a conglomerate of egoism and altruism, of fascination and fallacy?

Let us for the moment make the most of all the best in it, and take it, or even the whole book, as the sincere expression of the intense feeling of a sensitive mind, and the passionate yearning of a sympathetic heart. These, in the degree of their reality, cannot but desire a practical result. What is wanted in such case is not that readers should admire 'style,' or critics pass judgement, but that real betterment should be promoted in society, that wrongs should be righted, injustice stopped, tyrannies prevented, sufferers relieved, vices cured, the

despairing cheered, the lost reclaimed. A couple of sentences will suffice to do justice to the writer's intentions in this respect.

I tell you there is hardly a battered drab, a broken pauper, a hardened thief, a hopeless drunkard, a lurking tramp, a hooligan, who might not have been an honest and a useful citizen under fair conditions.

My friends, for the sake of good men who are better than their gods; for the sake of good women who are the pride and glory of the world; for the sake of the dear children who are sweeter to us than the sunshine or the flowers; for the sake of the generation not yet spoiled or lost; for the sake of the nations yet unborn; in the names of justice, of reason, and truth, I ask you for a verdict of Not Guilty.

Now the Christian reader of this plea has neither the need nor the desire to underrate in the slightest degree all the genuine philanthropy which it appears to express. If he has learned of his Master, he is more than ready to welcome every one who is anxious to cast out the devils that mar human life and progress. But when the appeal is made 'in the names of justice, reason, and truth,' he is bound to examine it in their light rather than in the dim glow of mere emotion.

That being so, two questions at least must arise: (i) Is this 'verdict of Not Guilty' justified? (ii) What is likely to be the result of asserting it?

(i) The first of these we have sufficiently answered already. Still, as the writer thinks it worth while to reiterate his 'claim,' it may be best for us to repeat our proof of its fallacy. Here (pp. 251, 252) he says:

I claim to have proved that all human actions are ruled by heredity and environment, that man is not responsible for his heredity and environment, and that therefore all blame and all punishment is unjust.

We 'claim,' on the contrary, to have proved, that (a) all human actions are not ruled, but only influenced,

by heredity and environment. (*b*) That the moment it is shown that actions are so ruled, they cease to be human and become merely automatic. (*c*) That whilst man is not responsible for his heredity, he is responsible for the use that he, as a person, and distinct from his inherited potentialities, makes of his heredity.<sup>1</sup> (*d*) That man is, at least in part, responsible for his environment; and that his influence upon his environment is as real, and may be as great, as the influence of environment upon him. (*e*) That, therefore, blame, in fair measure according to knowledge and opportunity, is not only just, but is in itself a tribute to the humanity, the personal dignity, the moral worth, of every man, however depraved he may be.

(ii) Leaving the reader to his own judgement hereupon, let us face the other query. What is likely to be the effect of such doctrine in view of its persistent advocacy, and the possibility of its being for various reasons accepted. Will it make for righteousness, and help to bring about the golden age of social amelioration? Now the author is warranted in remarking that 'one does not live half a century without knowing one's world pretty well.' And in the light of that remark it may be truly said that all men of sense will agree that to tell the sweater, and the lazy plutocrat, the drunkard and the gambler, the seducer and murderer, that they are not responsible for anything they do, is rather to give them carte blanche for further unmeasured villainy, than to suggest any glimpse of reform. But in order to hear this case out to the uttermost, we will briefly examine the five paragraphs in which Automatism is defended and recommended as the hope of the future. They may be typically taken from p. 241.

<sup>1</sup> 'In his battle with the stream of environment, he is using heredity and environment,' p. 133.

Mr. Marson says that if he were a burglar he would spend some of the money he stole in paying lecturers to teach the doctrine that men ought not to be blamed for their actions. But if all men were trained upon our principles *there would not be any burglars.*

Here we note (i) that on all ordinary principles of the 'justice, reason, and truth' to which the final appeal is made, Mr. Marson would seem to be abundantly justified in his suggestion. Then (ii) that the reply simply substitutes italicized assertion without proof, for proof with reasons. Nothing is easier, and nothing false, than such bald assertion. For this belauded training would necessarily begin with childhood, and the children would be trained to believe that they were not responsible for anything they said or did. Is there any school in the land that will engage to educate children thus? Assuming that they are well grounded in this, when they arrive at manhood or womanhood it means, if it means anything, that whatever they want they may have by simply taking it, no matter whence or how. 'In any case they are not to blame.' If this is not the utmost conceivable incentive to burgling in particular, and anarchy in general, what is or can be?

Is it suggested that the heredity and environment would be such that no man could or would burgle? Confessedly an automaton could not be a burglar, but if in that automatic sense there were no thieves, there would at the same time be no honest men. The possibility of robbing is the very condition of the existence of honesty. But as to an improved heredity and environment putting an end to such bad conduct as burgling represents, the writer, as usual, answers himself. For on p. 247 we are told, and truly, that 'There are many very poor who do no serious wrong; there are many amongst the rich, the successful, and the respectable, whose lives are evil.' (Although 'there are no good and no bad.')

Now take the next paragraph.

However let us see what Mr. Marson means. He means that if punishment and blame were abolished, burglars and other wrong-doers might go scot-free and might rob or kill or cheat; and no one should say them nay. But Mr. Marson is a clergyman and does not understand.

From all one can gather, it is this kind of 'style' that makes the writer popular with a certain class. But for men of reason, the substitution of impertinence for logic is of little avail. For the semblance of reasoning in this case we have the next paragraph.

It is a strange notion this, that if you do not blame a man you cannot interfere with him. We do not blame a lunatic: even a Christian does not blame a lunatic. But we do not allow a madman to go round with an axe and murder people. We do not hang a madman, nor punish him in any way. If a murderer is proved to be mad, he is pardoned and—restrained.

This is certainly a precious and inspiring piece of dialectic. The manifest and fundamental assumption is that the burglar is a lunatic. But is he? Or, to put it in general terms, is it true or false that every wrong-doer is a lunatic and should be treated as one? It is false. And for the most unanswerable of reasons. The very suggestion involves a contradiction in terms. Why does 'even a Christian' not blame a lunatic? Because a lunatic cannot do wrong. Lunacy means that he does not know what wrong is. That which he does not know, he certainly cannot do. Hence it follows that no really wrong-doer can be a lunatic, just as no lunatic can be a wrong-doer. Thus, again, it is false to say that 'if a murderer is proved to be mad, he is pardoned.' He is not. For the simple reason that there is nothing to pardon. He has done no wrong. That is why we do not hang or punish a madman, whatever he does.

Hence we see that the special sympathy of the 'new philosophy' for all wrong-doers consists in regarding

them as lunatics. Or in the writer's own words : ' These should be regarded as we regard base or savage animals as creatures of a lower order.' In a word, we should rob them of their manhood and credit them with animalhood or imbecility. Thus we now know how to complete the sentence formerly quoted : ' I want to awaken the working man's faith in himself '—as a brute or a lunatic. A noble ' defence ' truly !

So although we might not blame a thief, or a sweater, or a poisoner, it does not follow that we should allow him to go on stealing, or sweating, or murdering.

' Allow him to go on ' ? Why, if he were a lunatic he never began. No lunatic ever did or ever could steal, or sweat, or murder. He does not even know what such terms mean.

But if any man really has been a thief, or sweater, or murderer, then assuredly he is no lunatic. And so at last we come to the real question, viz. what to do with those who are not mad, but are sane enough to do wrong, knowing it to be wrong. The much-laboured notion of treating them as lunatics being as impossible in practice as absurd in theory, what is left by way of saving society from evil-doers ? Well, the mountain has long been in labour ; what is it bringing forth ?—a mouse. And a microscopic mouse at that. For in the final suggestion there is virtually no moral principle whatever. Evil-doers are to be ' restrained ' !

Now we have seen that evil-doers are not lunatics. And we know that restraint, as here contemplated, is a physical matter. In a word it is brute force. So we arrive at the marvellous discovery, that the best remedy for moral evil is physical force ! The ' new philosophy ' has positively nothing more or better to offer than this, for the regeneration of society. And then prates about understanding human nature ! What it really does is to give up morals in despair ; to confirm all who are already

doing wrong ; and to promise later an unmeasured host of irresponsibles, as the citizens of the future. And this is philanthropy !

Yet hear the rest (p. 242):

We propose to defend society from the individual, but we propose to do more than that : we propose to do what the Christian does not attempt to do—we propose to defend the individual from society.

How the first proposition here is to come to pass, we have already seen. Every wrong-doer is to be treated as a lunatic, and put into a strait-jacket or in prison. For it is quite certain that lunatics will not yield up their liberty save to overwhelming force. It is useless to make any appeal to them, any more than to a mad dog. Only use force. Large hope this, of a better moral future !

As to the second proposition. (i) How is the individual to be defended from society ? By asserting that society is not to blame for anything. As for its injustices and cruelties to individuals, it simply cannot help them (p. 234). But it 'can be taught to help' them. Indeed ? Pray, how ? By pointing out how the individual needs, and would be improved by, better environment ? Society knows that already, and has known it for ages past. Then by causing society to act upon this knowledge ? If causing means compelling, how is society to be compelled ? Not by laws, for there are plenty of these already, if only they were obeyed. How then bring about obedience to these, and any others that may be made ? If causing such obedience does not mean compulsion but appeal, to what can appeal be made ? If society cannot help it, there is an end of appeal. Certainly the individual has no power to 'restrain' society.

There is but one way, viz. to allow the 'new philosophy' once more to contradict itself. For whereas at one moment it says that society cannot be guilty, at

another<sup>1</sup> it tells society that it is a 'blood-guilty mob of heathen.' Whilst on one page we are told that no man—and therefore no men joined in society—is responsible for anything, on another it is asserted that 'compensation' is due (p. 207) from society because it is 'responsible' for the degradation of the individual. Thus after all the trumpet-blowing, we come back once more to common sense and true morality.

(ii) As to 'what the Christian does not attempt to do.' It is a curious statement, seeing that this writer himself informs us, as we will in a moment more fully show, that this protection of the individual is virtually what Christian principle is always doing, more hopefully as well as more effectively than any other principle.

Our author, with many others, believes that Socialism is the best ideal that the future can bring to pass for civilized humanity. Let us for the moment take him at his word.<sup>2</sup> But even the ardent admirer who belauds the book in *The Clarion*, drops a hint to this effect: 'I've heard it said that a book like *The Bottom Dog* was putting the clock of Socialism backwards.' And all the bluff in the world will not conceal the fact that it is so. Nor can any number of pages of verbal ingenuity prevent the rational perception that it must be so. For the exaltation of Automatism, and the consequent reduction of human society to a mere incoherent herd of irresponsibles, could only issue—if it were practically conceivable—in social chaos. Mercifully it is impossible. But the progress which cannot be altogether prevented, may be wofully retarded. And whilst, speaking generally, social evolution is so far proceeding that this age is the most democratic, just, philanthropic, of any in history, yet the human clock would not only be

<sup>1</sup> *God and My Neighbour*, p. ix.

<sup>2</sup> The reasons for thinking sympathetically concerning true Socialism I have briefly set forth in the recent issue by the Wesleyan Methodist Union for Social Service, entitled *The Citizen of To-morrow*, pp. 88-103.



made to lose time, but put back beyond savagery, if it were in any serious degree accepted that 'no man is answerable for his own acts.' If Socialism stands for the best that the coming days can bring to civilization, then assuredly the Automatism which regards man as the mere puppet of heredity and environment, is the very last and worst way of attaining to it. Nor can any conceivable doctrine so retard the wise and worthy development of all true social philanthropy.

As a matter of fact, whilst well-known Christian advocates such as Dr. Clifford, Dr. James Wilson, Canon Scott Holland, Dr. Horton, Revs. Father Adderley, C. F. Aked, and S. E. Keeble, with many others, have been labouring during the last decade, with no little success, to rob Socialism of its terrors in the eyes of the timid, their work has now been largely undone by *The Clarion*. All opponents to Socialism, even at its best, have now weapons in plenty provided for them by which to fight it to the uttermost. Whether their opposition is sincere and sensible or not, they can now at any moment point to the most popular leader of Socialism as being absolutely pledged to destroy all that is Christian, and to maintain a philosophy which practically puts an end to all morality.

For, religion or no religion, the day when universal justice shall so prevail as to give to every man at least a fair chance to make life worth living,

When the schemes and all the systems, kingdoms and republics  
fall,  
Something higher, kindlier, holier, all for each and each for all,

will most certainly never be hastened in its coming by proclaiming every wrong-doer a lunatic, and every right-doer a marionette, to whom goodness and badness alike are for ever impossible. Such a scheme is, manifestly, no less social than moral insanity.

## XII

## Modern Society's Supreme Need Exactly the Contrary

**T**HIS positive follows necessarily from the preceding negative. But its direct importance is such as to merit special emphasis. If Socialism, or any better social scheme, is ever to come to pass, it can and will only be by *evoking and employing the best there is in every man*. Human automata which can only be kept by sheer force from behaving like a bull in a china-shop or a fire that has got beyond control, will never hasten, let alone bring to pass, the Golden Age. If there be any hope of social betterment for this century, it consists in making the most, not the least, of every man; the best, not the worst, of every member of human society. This is only done when man is treated as a man, not a thing; as a responsible creature, not a human dummy; as a moral being, not a mere cork tossed upon the waters of heredity or a biped of putty compressed into any shape by environment. Insistence upon manhood, real, free, causative, responsible, in however varying degrees, is the only hope for humanity's better future. And this applies to 'a battered drab, a broken pauper, a hardened thief, a hopeless drunkard, a lurking tramp, a hooligan,' quite as really as to the respectable and comfortable citizen.

For the latter, what is most of all needed is the inten-

sification of the sense of responsibility, so that there may come about a clearer, tenderer, more practical, more comprehensive answer to the venerable shuffle, 'Am I my brother's keeper?' For the former, the great essential is indeed 'to awaken his faith in himself'; but it must be a real self, not an illusion; real enough to be able to sin, and therefore also to be able to work out his own salvation in every sense. Christ's matchless story is as true to philosophy as to religion, when it relates concerning the prodigal son, that 'when he came to himself' he said—two great and all-comprehending assertions—'I will,' and 'I have sinned.' The existence and the working of those convictions will do and actually does more to redeem the man from brutality and despair, than all the Determinism, Automatism, Fatalism, in the whole history of philosophy.

Indeed, for all who are open to reason, nothing is more tragically manifest than that to-day, as through the ages past, *all the worst of which this book rightly complains, is brought to pass by acting upon the doctrine it advocates.* The reader's attention is challenged to every word of this statement. 'Every social question,' said Henry George, 'means at bottom a social wrong.' And what is a social wrong but an instance of a man's trampling upon moral responsibility, i.e. acting upon the principle that he is 'not answerable for his own acts'? First, assisted by Secularism, he gets rid of the conviction (which saved Joseph from crime) that he is responsible to God. Then, guided by such philosophy as *The Clarion* now propagates, he dismisses all notion of responsibility altogether, and covers up all his laziness, pride, selfishness, seduction, robbery, murder, with the sufficient but infernal axiom 'I couldn't help it.'

On the other hand, whether we think of the respectable or the submerged, the greatest needs of both of them are comprised in Christ's second great command, 'Thou shalt love thy fellow man as thou lovest thyself.'

The human sinner who has come to condemn himself, and so is 'lost' because he has lost all higher hope, is bidden love himself. That is, he is reminded by the very twin realities of sin and grace, of his nature's dignity, and of his call to the highest. When this is realized, then—and then only, for the beginning of the command is necessarily at the end—he will be able to recognize in others the same value and potentiality which he has found in himself. So will he rejoice to be his brother's keeper.

The marvellous feature of the present case is that the writer of this philosophically worthless book before us has himself both acknowledged the two principles just outlined, and actually published a most clear, vivid, and forceful recommendation of them to modern men and women. He has indeed done probably more than any other popular writer of our day to baptize an unattractive word into a most useful, tender, powerful sense. 'Altruism,' as represented in his booklet thereupon, has passed out of the dry realm of technical philosophy into the living world of love, and duty, and hope.

The positive value of this service we will gratefully recognize in a moment. Here and now it is our undesired but necessary task to point out that this true and noble recommendation of Altruism is, alike in its essence and implications, the most direct antithesis and utter contradiction of the Bottom Dog philosophy. That such a contradiction is unintentional does not mitigate it. In the most unqualified sense it must be affirmed that if *Altruism* be true, *Not Guilty* is false. That the latter is the actual case, may be shown in few additional words.

We will not here lay stress upon the direct self-contradiction exhibited on page 3 of the excellent little booklet referred to, although it is glaring enough, certainly :

'I cannot believe in the existence of Jesus Christ.'<sup>1</sup>

'Altruism, which is the embodiment of the command, "Love thy neighbour as thyself," seems to have originated in the teachings of Christ.'<sup>2</sup>

How anything can be due to the teaching of one who never existed, may be left to the brilliant but mistaken mythologist from whom our author has plainly borrowed his later sentiment. It does not call for disproof.

We are here concerned with the human problem. What human society needs, now apparently more than ever, is indeed—to quote the full title of the booklet—'*Altruism, Christ's glorious Gospel of love, against man's dismal science of greed.*' Can this, however, come to pass on the lines of *The Bottom Dog*? It cannot, by any possibility.

And, briefly, for these reasons :

The future and far-reaching reform which is contemplated by Altruism, demands both negative and positive means to bring it to pass. There must manifestly be uncompromising opposition to evil men and influences, as well as development of good. Whence are these to come?

(i) Let us first mark well the evil to be overcome :

Consider all the vain pride and barbaric pomp of wealth and fashion, and all the mean envy of the weakly snobs who revere them, and would sell their withered souls to possess them. Is this decorative tomfoolery, are this apish swagger and blazoned snobbery worthy of *men and women*? (p. 250).

Many of us will quickly and emphatically answer such a question. But we, being Altruists, can afford to do so. Indignation, on our part, can well be as consistent as intense. For the Bottom Dog philosophy, however, there are no 'men and women,' as we have plainly seen. There are only 'creatures of heredity and environment,' who cannot help anything they do—who, in a word, are

<sup>1</sup> *God and my Neighbour*, p. 9 (1903).

<sup>2</sup> *Altruism, Christ's Glorious Gospel of Love*, &c., p. 3 (1902).

lunatics. In that case the question proposed above may be answered in the affirmative. 'Decorative tomfoolery and blazoned snobbery' are eminently worthy of lunatics, and all the eloquence of twenty *Clarions* will never be able to persuade them that the 'apish swagger' of a society 'cake-walk,' is not a most dignified proceeding and one deserving to be perpetuated for ever.

Or again (p. 259):

The laws were made by ignorant and dishonest men; they are administered by men ignorant and selfish; they are dishonest laws; good for neither rich nor poor; evil in their conception, evil in their enforcement, evil in their result.

But even if we accept these last clauses as truly descriptive of some human laws—certainly not of all—and want to get them altered, the problem of making and administering better laws remains. The statement here contradicts both itself and the book before us.

(a) Law-makers cannot be both 'ignorant and dishonest,' for the very essence of dishonesty is knowledge. The dishonest man is one who knows what is due to others and withholds it. So, too, the selfish man knows what others ought to have, but deliberately keeps it himself. Thus mere knowledge is no cure for bad law-making.

(b) But we are bound also to ask, how any man can possibly be either dishonest or selfish when he cannot help anything he does? Is a dishonest thing conceivable?—or a selfish automaton? We all know that it is not. Hence we see that the only recipe for the destruction of evil in society provided by the new philosophy, is akin to that urged by the fanatic cult calling itself 'Christian science'—being really neither Christianity nor science—viz. say there is no ill, and there will be none. It is a counsel of delusion.

(iii) But, positively, every philanthropist knows that what is needed most of all, in every direction, is a

higher standard of character and duty. The book before us says, indeed, right nobly (pp. 249, 251) :

The glory of manhood and womanhood is not to have something, but to be something ; is not to get something, but to give something ; is not to rule, but to serve.

But this is Altruism pure and simple, almost in New Testament language. Is it also and at the same time the Automatism of *The Bottom Dog*? Assuredly it is not. A saying of the Apostle Paul fits in here only too aptly : 'If any man thinketh himself to be something when he is nothing, he deceiveth himself.' The man who is not answerable for his own acts is, morally, nothing. Nor can any string of strong assertions ever make him something. Morally, spiritually, virtuously, nobly, unselfishly, an automaton—'a creature of heredity and environment'—is and for ever must be—nothing. Away then, at once and finally, goes the possibility of character of any kind.

So that if the pathetic pleading of the last paragraph should succeed—'I ask you for a verdict of Not Guilty'—it would be the greatest calamity that could possibly befall the 'battered drab' or the 'hardened thief.' If they are not guilty, they are not bad men. If they are not bad men, there is no chance whatever of their ever being good men. The paradox holds good to the uttermost—no guilt, no hope. But to annihilate manhood under the pretence of restoring it, is even worse than the old surgery which bled a man to death in order to save his life.

It is undoubtedly true that 'the man who would be happy, must find his duty and do it.' But it requires a man to find a duty. The notion of a biped not answerable for anything he does searching for duty, is only grotesque. As well imagine one of Madame Tussaud's wax murderers seeking for forgiveness. A man capable of duty there may be. And a creature who cannot help

anything he does, there may be. But the two cannot be one, until the round can be square.

Finally. If we still accept Socialism as expressing the best that can happen to future generations, the following is specially worthy of regard :

If Socialism is to live and conquer, it must be a religion. If Socialists are to prove themselves equal to the task assigned them, they must have a faith—a real faith, a live faith, a new faith. The faith in a glorious destiny of the human race; the faith that demands of its votaries love and self-sacrifice even to death in the cause of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

Well and nobly said ! But can an automaton have a 'religion' ? Can a biped, not answerable for its acts, 'love' ? Can a mere puppet of heredity and environment have 'a live faith' ? Can a creature that cannot help anything it does, be capable, under any circumstances whatever, of 'self-sacrifice' ? The plain and emphatic answer to all these queries is, the appreciative adoption of the booklet just specified, and the unhesitating dismissal of the book before us as, in its own terms, 'not worth the paper it is printed on.'

Altruism is, in very deed, the need of civilization. But Altruism is doubly a sentiment and an enthusiasm. It reveres and loves self, as worth loving and revering. Then it reveres and loves others, because they, too, are selves. But the 'new philosophy' annihilates both. What human society most needs, therefore, it must be again and again reiterated, is Altruism, not Automatism.

<sup>1</sup> *Altruism*, &c. p. 10



## XIII

## Every Valid and Helpful Suggestion already included in Christian Principles

**T**RUTH to tell, and that sorrowfully, there is not much that is either helpful or hopeful in the pages we are scrutinizing. When all the unhelpful vauntings, the manifest self-contradictions, the false representations of Christian fact and teaching, the mistaken philosophy and impossible morality, together with the degrading estimate of human nature, are subtracted, there is pitifully little left. The *Times* reviewer did the author no injustice when he summed up this work thus :

What Mr. Blatchford really has in mind is that a great deal might be done to diminish crime and vice by more sympathy, kindness, forbearance, and help, instead of reprobation ; and he is fully justified in pleading for that. But in trying to give it a philosophical basis he is out of his depth and only cuts a ridiculous figure.

The pleading here mentioned is, however, manifest, and constitutes the redeeming feature of the book. But unfortunately it requires itself to be redeemed from no small measure of untruth. For it is everywhere a comparative plea. The writer is not content with mere pleading. It is associated throughout with bitter and contemptuous reference to Christian thoughts, feelings, and practices, in face of the same facts. Everywhere the reader is informed, with measureless variety of flout and gibe, that 'this is not a human nation and never

will be while it accepts Christianity as its religion.<sup>1</sup> One has 'only to imagine' Determinism in full vogue, to appreciate its superiority to Christianity, and so on, the supreme instance of italicized question-begging and pseudo-infallible assertion being reserved for the last sentence: 'Besides, gentlemen, Christianity is not *true*.'

In the preceding pages we have shown by plain reasoning, which is better than imagination, that such superiority is a delusion. The reduction of human nature to a mere shuttlecock of heredity and environment, is sheer degradation, and evacuates life of all its highest values.

Now, speaking negatively, it is too manifest to need demonstration that Christian principles are entirely free from any share in such human belittling. Whether those who revere the Bible and seek to follow Christ are called the 'free-will party,' or aught else, it is to the unmeasured honour of their philosophy that it never treats man as less than man, nor ever contemplates the most depraved sinner, whether he be a savage of Fiji or a hooligan of London, as 'base or savage animals, creatures of a lower order'—in a word, 'bottom dogs.' Their creed is that 'there is no respect of *persons* with God.' How any self-respecting man can be brought to accept a doctrine which degrades him from a person to a thing, passes all intelligent comprehension. But looking at the whole case more positively, we are bound to challenge this much-vaunted superiority of the 'new philosophy.' Additional reasons, definite even if brief, for affirming exactly the contrary, are as follows.

As to the general theme of heredity and environment, short of the representation of these as compelling forces whereby the human personality is crushed into nothing—which constitutes at once the novelty and falsity of the 'new philosophy'—there is neither originality nor

<sup>1</sup> *God and My Neighbour*, p. 197.

superiority in modern Automatism. All that can be said with truth, is that these are realities which powerfully affect human character. This, however, has been not only acknowledged, but emphasized from the earliest times mentioned in the Bible. So much so, that a favourite objection with Secularists and others, has been what they have termed the injustice of the law of heredity as enunciated in Exodus and Ezekiel. Only the wilfully blind can fail to mark the potency attributed to environment in the New Testament.

But let us come to one or two more instances in detail. On p. 246 we read :

Many of the gentlemen on the other side are Christian ministers. They uphold blame and punishment in direct defiance of the teaching and example of Jesus Christ.

The founder of their religion bade them love their enemies. He taught them that if one stole their coat, they should give him their cloak also. He prevented the punishment of the woman taken in adultery, and called upon him without sin to cast the first stone. He asked God to forgive his murderers because they knew not what they did. In not one of these cases did Christ say a word in favour of punishment nor of blame.

Now in regard to this precious specimen of specious falsity, the first note to be made is as to the expression 'on the other side.' For it must be distinctly understood that this is only true as regards the folly of Automatism. So far as indignation at unnecessary suffering is concerned, or pleading for more sympathy and lovingkindness towards wrong-doers, or even striving for some kind of Collectivism which shall put a final end to the cut-throat competition of modern civilization, thousands of Christian ministers are not 'on the other side' at all. They have been on this—the right side—quite as earnestly as this writer, and long years before *The Clarion* was ever heard of.

But as to the rest of these sentences, how can common honesty deal courteously with such a travesty of truth?

It is humiliating to have to expose such inexcusably superficial misrepresentations. Does the Sermon on the Mount teach that no man is to be blamed or punished whatever he may be or do? Any child knows better. Is there no blame or punishment in this: 'Whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of the hell of fire,'—and the rest?

As to the woman taken in adultery, the automatic case cannot even be here stated without contradicting itself. 'Called upon him without sin to cast,' &c. So they 'went out one by one' because they were convinced of *sin*. And even to her, the Master said, in His pitying love, 'from henceforth *sin* no more.' Will our author have the hardihood to affirm that the Christ of the Gospels represented sin as being neither blameworthy nor punishable?

'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.' Does any mind at once intelligent and sincere, understand for one moment that Christ here meant that His murderers were not at all to blame nor answerable for their acts? Truly the philosophy that needs to be propped up by such sophistries as this, must be in a pitiful case. Has the writer never read this—'Jesus answered Pilate . . . therefore he that delivered Me unto thee hath greater sin'?<sup>1</sup>

But the whole pitiful travesty is worthy of the question that follows:

How, then, can Christians advocate the blame of the weak, and the punishment of the persecuted and unfortunate?

To which there is but one answer. How can an author who professes to advocate truth write such falsities? No Christian, no man who is a man, has ever blamed the weak, or wished to punish the unfortunate,

<sup>1</sup> John xix. 11. Or, as Dr. Weymouth renders it, 'He who has delivered Me up to you is more guilty than you are.' There is little allowance of a general verdict of 'not guilty' in that, surely.

for being such. The suggestion is sheer calumny. How, in the face of sentences like these, men can be found to regard the work containing them as 'the best thing this writer has done,' passes comprehension indeed, but leaves an estimate of his other writings which some of us would be sorry to share.

What, moreover, are we to think of this?—

If it moves us to learn that disease may be prevented, that ruin may be averted, that broken hearts and broken lives may be made whole; if it inspires us to hear how beauty may be conjured out of loathliness, and glory out of shame; how waste may be turned to wealth, and death to life, and despair to happiness, then the case for the Bottom Dog is a case to be well and truly tried (p. 9).

Indeed it is. And when tried 'truly'—i.e. according to fact and reason, not glamour and misrepresentation—what is the verdict? This, that more of such actual rescues, preventions, transformations, are now being done by the work of the Christian Churches in one year than all unbelief, Determinism, Automatism, Fatalism, put together, have done in all their history.<sup>1</sup> To sneer at all this as being merely 'palliative,' is as unworthy as unjustified. For (i) it is in thousands of cases the only thing that can be done at the moment. The notion of doing nothing until a perfect social scheme shall have been concocted and set going, is as cruel as absurd. Furthermore (ii) there are quite as many and as earnest Christian philanthropists and politicians anxious to do

<sup>1</sup> It is almost invidious to specify one instance out of so many which are all true to the same type. But in the last report of a year's work in connexion with the Manchester and Salford Mission, under Mr. Collier's charge, we find that during the year 136,145 beds and 476,505 meals have been provided for the poor and destitute. Work has been provided in labour yards and workrooms connected with the various homes and refuges for those who have received bed and food. No unfair competition with the labour market is allowed. Besides the Prison Gate Mission and the Medical Mission, every Sunday food is provided for the poor and destitute, of which during the year 28,452 have availed themselves. Temporary work has been found for 2,271, and 318 placed in permanent positions through the Labour Bureaux.

everything that public opinion and law can do for radical reform, as there are Agnostics or rabid anti-Christians. And more.

But consider, again, one of the best sentences in our book (p. 226):

Punish *less*, and teach more; blame *less*, and encourage more; hate less, and love more; and you will get not a lowering but a raising of the moral standard; not an increase in crime but a decrease. And the improvement will be due to an alteration for the better of—environment.

Even here two things cannot but be observed: (i) that in the words italicized the author gives up his whole case, and (ii) that every word of this is not so much endorsed as it has been anticipated, by all religion which is true to Christ.

So, too, when we read (p. 227), that—

There was a blackguard in my company who once threatened to murder me. A few months later he was taken ill in the night and I attended him and probably saved his life. He never forgot it. It was but a small kindness, and he was what is generally called a scoundrel, but he showed his gratitude to me all the rest of the time I was in the army,

we have everything consonant with Christian principles, and contrary to the doctrine of the book. For is it common sense, let alone philosophy, to talk about 'gratitude' when there is nothing to be grateful for? An officer helps a private in distress. Well, what if he does? He could not help doing it. He is not answerable for what he does. If he is not to be blamed for anything, is he to be thanked? Gratitude is permanent thankfulness. Then are we to be grateful to fire for warming us, or to water for quenching our thirst? According to the doctrine of *Not Guilty*, the officer here contemplated was no more a subject for gratitude, than the bed on which the sufferer lay.

But when we break away from the folly of such doctrine, we see here simply that the officer acted as he

himself owns Christ bade His disciples act. And yet it is this same officer, now turned philosopher (?), who tells us (i) that he does not think Christ ever lived, but (ii) he is sure that the best thing we can do is to 'fight with both hands' and endeavour to 'smash' the Churches, which—whatever their failures—most of all seek to perpetuate His influence on earth.

Mercifully, here again, he contradicts himself. For, after unequivocally defining Altruism as 'Christ's glorious gospel of love, against man's dismal science of greed'—he deliberately prints, with the Socialist millennium in view<sup>1</sup>:

To me it seems beyond question true that the spread of Altruism is the most important consummation in the progress of social evolution. Altruism, indeed, is more important than Socialism itself. Given universal love of man for man, and we should have something better than Socialism itself.

We are told that this gospel of Altruism is identical with the gospel of Christ, and that this gospel has been preached for eighteen centuries to deaf ears and obdurate hearts. It is a beautiful gospel, say our practical friends, but it is futile. After eighteen centuries of pious iteration, nothing has come of it.

Has nothing come of it? But almost every noble action and sweet personality in all those centuries has come of it. A very great deal of our progress has come of it. All the mercy and patience we have in the present, and all the hope we have in the future has come of it. And let the day of Socialism be near or far, when that day arrives, Socialism also will have come of it.

In face of such an avowal, criticism is disarmed. We will let go unspecified many other instances of the unwisdom of the writer's other utterances. Suffice it to say that whilst we know that the Christianity which is not Altruism is but a self-condemned delusion, the faith which is thus true to Christ, more than covers and includes everything that the 'new philosophy' can suggest, for the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

<sup>1</sup> *Altruism*, pp. 6, 10.

## XIV

## Conclusion

SUCH criticism as the preceding pages contain, is a task as painful as necessary, as thankless as true.

Amidst the crying injustices of our modern life, and the ghastly extremes of social condition which make some phases of civilization to be as abominable as others are intolerable, all who share the passion of a genuine philanthropy ought to be working not only hand in hand, but heart with heart. It is ten thousand pities when a writer who has nobly won for himself a hearing and an influence which might have told for ever-growing good, should be found greatly hindering if not ruining both, by yielding himself up wholly to a scientific fallacy and a literary delusion. For it may safely be affirmed that neither the materialistic-monism of Professor Haeckel, nor the mythological mirage of Mr. J. M. Robertson, will ever help to advance one step the vastly needed social reform for which *The Clarion* so long has stood.

There was room for fresh and earnest appeal, based on the demonstration of the often-underrated influence of both heredity and environment. Unquestionably society in general, and the Churches in particular, have a great deal to learn in these respects. One who has pointed this out with sufficient plainness, years ago, to earn the suspicions of the orthodox and the denunciations of religious conservatism,<sup>1</sup> may be permitted to defend Christian essence as against unchristian accident

<sup>1</sup> These were freely showered upon me as the result of the publication of *The Mission of Christianity*, now out of print. But its pages simply anticipated what has since been developed in almost every direction.



It is worse than unphilosophical, it is absurd, to attempt to hew down a giant tree because of a few withered branches or blighted leaves.

Whatever be the faults of the Churches, the Christianity they should represent, stands quite as much for man as for God.<sup>1</sup> Manhood and Christianity stand or fall together. The very doctrine of human sin from which Christianity obtains its emphasis on love divine, testifies to this. In a most real sense, it is a glorious thing to be a sinner. For it connotes a dignity behind, and a destiny in front, such as is suggested by no other of all earth's religions or philosophies. And even if its disciples have themselves misunderstood its genius, and misrepresented to a sad extent its aim and influence, common fairness dictates that they should be allowed to learn, to correct mistakes, and to develop all that is true and good, quite as freely as men of science in their varied departments.

Certainly when the writer who has previously published *Altruism* now says:—

I will oppose Liberalism and Toryism and Christianity as long as I have the use of my hands. . . . So we find once more the Churches banded together to oppose the forces of reform. It is always so. It has been always so. The Churches must be fought and defeated,

the attitude is not only self-contradictory and unworthy, but involves a downright libel.

How self-contradictory it is, the writer's own words just cited are enough to show. It is unworthy of any writer of intelligence to lump together Toryism, Liberalism, and Christianity, without discrimination. It is an utter libel to say that Christian Churches of the land

<sup>1</sup> No book has ever contained a falser sentence than this: 'Christianity concerns itself with God and man, putting God first and *man last*' (*God and My Neighbour*, p. 190). There is not a word in the New Testament to justify the words italicized. For any mind open to 'justice, reason, and truth' the strong words of the Apostle John alone (1 John iv. 20, 21) give the lie direct to such misrepresentings.

to-day, as such, are 'banded together' against reform. They are no more so than Socialists are banded together against the sanctities of home and family.

It pleases the author of *God and My Neighbour* (on p. 192) to launch out into a furious tirade against the Christian doctrine of holiness. On the same page of *Clarion Fallacies*, this onslaught is shown in detail to be as unjustifiable as gratuitous. Here, in face of all possible quips or sneers, we simply reiterate that true holiness is the only hope of civilization. If any man chooses to interpret it as 'dreamy, self-centred emotionalism,' or 'craven fear,' or 'selfish retirement from the trials and buffets and dirty work of the world,' it is but the fault of his own wilful ignorance. It is just as false and as reprehensible as if a Christian advocate to-day should persist in defining Socialism as the cult of anarchy and free love. Christian holiness may safely be defined in Professor Seeley's words as 'higher-toned goodness,' or, with equal truth, as dynamized Altruism. For it takes into fullest account, not one of the two great commands on which Christ laid such stress, but both. And it unequivocally insists that he who does not keep them both, keeps neither.

Let us compare its working with that of Automatism in a single given instance. On p. 82 of the former book we read :

Seven thousand pounds to repair a chapel to the praise and glory of God, and under its very walls you may buy a woman's soul for a few pieces of silver.

Could blind anti-Christian prejudice more effectually expose itself than thus? The sneer is unwarranted; the insinuation is false; the confessed result of following Determinist principles is crushing.

(i) Money spent 'to repair a chapel' means quite as good employment as any other building, and so contributes to the well-being of the workmen, and lessens

the number of the unemployed. 'To the glory of God' is in perfect consonance with the highest welfare of man, individually and socially. To insinuate the contrary is a libel.

(ii) 'Under its very walls'—yes, but outside. Say what men like about the theology of the City Temple, if the ideal of human life and conduct continually set forth *within* its walls were but obeyed, there would not only be no prostitution, but the whole of the horrid list of wrongs which this writer prints as contrary to 'a really humane and civilized nation,' would absolutely disappear. Is not this what he wants? Why, then, revile the means which, if adopted, would infallibly bring it to pass?

(iii) 'You may buy a woman's *soul*.' 'A woman's soul'! What is that? What of 'soul' can be found, even with the strongest microscope, in a mere 'creature of heredity and environment'—a puppet of circumstance that can 'no more sin against God than a steam-engine can sin against the engineer who made it'? No. Soul and sin go together. No sin? Then assuredly no soul. Has a woman, in any sense, a soul that can be bought or sold? Then she is what the New Testament calls *hœr*—a sinner. But that is not all.

'You may buy.' *Who* may? Without shame and condemnation, only one man on earth may—viz. the Determinist. For he, of all human beings, 'is not answerable for his own acts.' *He* may seduce the poor half-starved girl who has no helper, but 'he is not to be blamed for anything he does.' *He* may glut his lusts upon her, and then fling her to misery and suicide; but he is 'not guilty,' because he could not do anything else. And this the doctrine that is to reform society, and bring the hope of universal betterment! Verily, the world will have to be demented before it heeds such counsels from below.

From one of the fourteen books of the Old Testament,

which the same writer thinks would be well destroyed, we may give all men and women of perception a single case, whose imitation would do more to purify and prevent this same saddest of human evils, than all the preaching of Determinism whilst the world lasts. 'How can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?' cried Joseph, when, pressed by his environment, he rejected lustful gratification. When will the men of London and of Paris say the same? Manifestly NEVER, whilst they are 'Determinists.' Only when they turn from the fallacies and degradation of Automatism to acknowledge the responsibility which makes them sinners, and the love which would help them to become saints.

It is easy enough to reply that real saints are few; that holiness is a counsel of perfection; that genuine Christianity involves an impossible standard. These allegations do not affect the present case. There is in them confessedly this truth—that Christian principles are costly to carry out. But Christ always said that they would be. The failure of the Churches to exemplify them may be tragic. But all that this amounts to is, that the world and human nature need more, not less, of Christ in heart and life, individually and socially. They need, above all else, the dynamic which Paul and his co-workers always avowed: 'We make it our chief ambition, whether we live or die, to be well pleasing to Him.'<sup>1</sup> And if the retort should be that this is pietism, 'dreamy, emotional, mystical,' the testimony of one who, of all the thinkers of the last century, was farthest from mysticism, may suffice for its dismissal. 'Nor even now,' said Mr. John Stuart Mill, 'would it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life.' All the clever criticisms, bitter cynicisms, of

<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. v. 9.

to-day's sharp-shooting unbelief, whether coarse or refined, do not touch the substantial truth of that estimate. Let civilization be filled with miniature Christs, men and women who strive above all else to be true to Him, and our problems would be at an end. To quote once more from our book :

Let the last be first, and the first last; let the strong support the weak and the great serve the small. That, it seems to me, is what we strive for, and are ready to die for; that is what we mean when we speak, or sing, or dream of Socialism.

So writes the author of *Altruism*. But these words of high ideal are Christ's. They express His mind and will, compared with which all the creeds, and formularies, and shibboleths, and ecclesiastical systems, are but as the dust of the balance. If this is not Christianity, nothing is.

But it is a two-edged sword. It cuts away certainly the smug selfishness of the nominal religion in pews which declares that it does not want Socialism in pulpits—which, being honestly translated, means that it does not want Christ. And it equally makes an end of the moral insanity of the bastard philosophy which would degrade men to things, under the pretence of making them better by external pressure. As if all the hydraulic pressure of all earth's heavenliest environments, could ever make an automaton into a man !

There is hope even for a millionaire—though Christ Himself considered it a hard case—so long as he retains his moral freedom. There is no hope, now or hereafter, for a non-self-determining puppet that simply shuffles about life's stage according as it is dragged by the wires of heredity and environment.

Christ's service—concerning which Strauss himself avowed that 'with reference to all that bears upon the love of God and of our neighbour, upon purity of heart and upon the individual life, nothing can be added to the moral intuition which Jesus Christ has left us'—at

all events requires real men, i.e. free men. Automata cannot do His bidding. It is true that the apostles gloried in calling themselves the 'slaves of Jesus Christ,' but it was the slavery of free-hearted, free-willed love. They did but embody that most blessed paradox of human nature at its highest, when, in love, he who is most bound is evermore most free. Even as he also who is most obedient to law, is most at liberty not only to serve but to conquer. So is he who is most true to the law of Christ, the genuine Rationalist, for he heeds and answers the question, 'Yea and why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?'<sup>1</sup> He is no less the real Freethinker, for in his ears are ever ringing his Master's far-reaching words, 'Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.' And assuredly, he is the only true Determinist. For he knows all that is meant—and all that is not meant—by the typical Christian attitude, 'I determined to know nothing among you save Jesus Christ, and Him crucified.' That narrow-minded pietistic bigotry is not meant, is elsewhere abundantly shown.<sup>2</sup> But that genuine self-determination is meant, there can be no question at all, in face of the companion avowal, 'Wherefore, O king Agrippa, I was not disobedient unto the heavenly vision.'<sup>3</sup> For, as we have seen above, obedience and disobedience are absurdities to any other than a free self-determining being. No mere consequence of heredity and environment could disobey anything.

Such self-determination is at once the everlasting condition of all morality, the glory as well as burden of manhood, and the only hope of the present or future possibility of that Altruism which stands for the Kingdom of Heaven on earth.

There are confessedly two sides to such self-determination, viewed as the Christian ideal of manhood—the

<sup>1</sup> Luke xii. 57.

<sup>2</sup> Phil. iv. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Acts xxvi. 19.

self that irrepressibly asserts, and the self that unreservedly submits. The former may be well, because strongly and nobly, expressed by a non-Christian poet.<sup>1</sup>

Out of the night that covers me,  
 Black as the pit from pole to pole,  
 I thank whatever gods there be  
 For my unconquerable soul.  
 In the fell clutch of circumstance,  
 I have not winced nor cried aloud;  
 Beneath the bludgeonings of chance,  
 My head is bloody—but unbowed.  
 Beyond this place of wrath and tears,  
 Looms but the horror of the shade  
 And yet the menace of the years  
 Finds, and shall find me, unafraid.  
 It matters not how strait the gate,  
 How charged with punishments the scroll;  
 I am the master of my fate,  
 I am the captain of my soul.

The latter is put by our late Laureate, with no less truth, and tenderness, and force.

Strong Son of God, immortal Love,  
 Whom we, that have not seen Thy face,  
 By faith, and faith alone, embrace,  
 Believing where we cannot prove:  
 Thou seemest human and divine,  
 The highest, holiest manhood Thou.  
 Our wills are ours—we know not how;  
 Our wills are ours, to make them Thine.

The writer whom we have been regretfully obliged thus to controvert asks, 'Is Christianity the only hope?' In the true sense, which embraces both of the above, we answer—YES! alike for the individual man, and for society at large. Would that he might yet see it, and lend his powerful aid towards bringing to pass his own Altruism!

<sup>1</sup> Mr. W. E. Henley.

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the first two, the third is a *deictic* pronoun, and the fourth is a *possessive* pronoun. The latter two are not in the paradigm of the first two.

There is a further difference between the two languages. In the first, the *deictic* pronouns are not inflected for gender, and the *possessive* pronouns are not inflected for number. In the second, the *deictic* pronouns are inflected for gender, and the *possessive* pronouns are inflected for number. The first language is a *deictic* language, and the second is a *possessive* language. The first language is a *deictic* language, and the second is a *possessive* language. The first language is a *deictic* language, and the second is a *possessive* language.

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